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THE CANON LAW AS A LEGAL SYSTEMFUNCTION, OBLIGATION, AND SANCTION*
By Robert E. Rodes, Jr.

and prelates who accomplished the vast intellectual articulation of the canon law during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries brought
to their task a highly developed set of value commitments but only a meager
supply of administrative resources. This unique combination of constituent
elements gives the system they produced - in addition to its intrinsic historical
interest - a special claim to the attention of students of legal theory. In this
essay, I shall attempt to give some account of the basic character and typical
problem-solving techniques of this system, in the hope of shedding some light
both on certain aspects of the history of the medieval Church and on certain perennial problems of legal theory.
THE SCHOLARS

For this purpose, I have tried to consider afresh the appropriate categories of analysis for dealing with the system. Consequently, I have dealt
as much as possible with the raw data of legislative and administrative
practice in isolation from the analytical framework with which the system
was approached by its own proponents. It is possible that a fuller treatment
of the subject along a similar line would require assigning a larger role to
the work of the commentators who played so large a part in the systematic
elaboration of the canons. I have neglected them because my object is in a
sense to stand in their shoes and substitute my analysis for theirs.
Because it was a study of certain English problems that led to the present
inquiry, I have drawn much of my legislative and administrative material
from English sources. Hence, a number of the details of my account will not
be applicable to conditions on the Continent. It seems established today,
however, that the basic nature and obligation of the canon law were not
differently understood in England than elsewhere in Western Europe.'
* I wish to express my thanks to the Ford Foundation for the grant that made possible
the work of which this article is a part.
1. See ERIC W. KEMP, AN INTRODUCTION TO CANON LAW IN THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND 11-32 (London, 1957).
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I. CONTENT

THE CANON LAW may be characterized as Christian theology structured by
Roman law, and brought to bear on the institutional necessities of the Church.
The juxtaposition of these three elements - Christian theology, Roman law,
and institutional necessity - provides the content of the system, and the tension among them provides the problematic of the system. Let us consider
briefly the contribution of each of these elements to the content, then turn
to what seem to me the three most serious problems raised by the tension
among them - the problems of function, of obligation, and of sanction.
A. Christian Theology.-Theology furnished the root principles of the
system 2 - the means of salvation and the corporate and juridical character
of the Christian people to whom and through whom the means of salvation
were revealed. In addition, it afforded the rudimentary structural elements
- the orders of the clergy, the primacy of the Roman Pontiff, the claims
of the Church to competence over against the state. Much of the substantive
content was also theological. The celibacy of the clergy, the indissolubility
of marriage, the suppression of simony are examples; all of them, although
they are developed in legal enactments, were in origin developments of
scriptural or doctrinal themes. Spiritual and pastoral experience added other
theological elements to the substantive content, such as the form of electing
4
bishops 3 or the payment of tithes.
In addition to these substantive elements, theology contributed at more
than one level to the procedural development of the system. The basic sanction of excommunication was derived from the scriptural attribution of
the power of the keys. At another level, the principle that requires a hearing
before the sentence of excommunication can be pronounced was formulated
with scriptural justifications. 5 At still another level, the late technical development of the denunciatio evangelica, whereby a remedy is afforded for
2.
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3. F. Claeys-Bouuaert, -0viques, 5 DICTIONNAIRE DE DROIT CANONIQUE 569, 575 (Paris,
1935-62). [Hereafter cited as DDC]
4. G. Lepointe, Dime, 4 DDC 1231-2.
5. Can. 8, 4 Lateran (1215), 22 SACRORUM CONCILIUM NOVA ET AMPLISSIMA COLLECTIO
994 (J. Mansi and others, eds., facsimile edition, Paris, 1903) [hereafter cited as MANSI],
c. 34, X, V, 1. In citing the Corpus Juris Canonici, I have used the form adopted in
the source notes to the 1918 Code. The form there given for citations from the Decretals
is the symbol "X," preceded by the number of the canon, and followed by those of the

book and title. See T. LINCOLN BOUSCAREN & ADAM ELLIS, CANON LAW, A
COMMENTARY 11-13 (Milwaukee, 1947), for a key to these citations.
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private wrongs, was derived directly from the Lord's admonition to "tell
6
the Church."
B. Roman Law.-While the canonists drew freely on the store of rules
and terminology afforded by contemporary Roman law scholarship,7 the
major contribution of the Roman law to the canonical system is its structure. It was to the Roman law that the canonists looked for the forms and
categories of legal analysis. Their descriptions of how the law operates, their
theoretical speculations on the nature of law, their manner of classifying
legal enactments as to subject matter or source were all taken directly or
indirectly from the Roman jurists.8 The great codifications that make up
the Corpus Juris Canonici were patterned on those that make up the Corpus
Juris Civilis. 9 Perhaps most important of all, the crucial theological principle of the primacy of the Pope was given its juridical form of the plenitudo
potestatis through the analogy of the place of the Emperor in the Roman
law.10
C. The Institutional Necessities of the Church.-The institutional necessities on which this legal system was brought to bear were in great part
the simple housekeeping ones of allocating the available personnel and resources to the task at hand. The development of benefices and parishes,
the rules against wandering from one diocese to another, and the rules regarding moral and intellectual qualifications for ordination are examples
of principles developed to meet these housekeeping needs.
Over and above these, there was the necessity of maintaining both the
material resources and the prestige of the institutional church as against the
6.
7.

Matthew 18. 15-18; Ch. Lefebvre, Rvangilique (Dinonciation), 5 DDC 557.
For the use of particular texts in the canonical collections, see C. deClercq, Corpus
Juris Civilis, 4 DDC 644, 661-80. A. ESMEIN, LE MARIAGE EN DROIT CANONIQUE 10119 (2nd ed., 1929) shows an interesting example of a dialectic between a theological
deduction and a rule of the Roman law in the development of a canonical rule. The
Roman law, which quite clearly provided that the essential for the marriage relation was
consent (Nuptias consensus non concubitus facit), ran counter to the deduction the theologians made from the scriptural analogy of the physical union of Christ and the Church.
As a result, the medieval canon law vacillated a great deal between consent and marital
intercourse as the effective consummation of the marriage. For a general discussion of the
place of Roman law in the canon law of marriage, see HERBERT JOLOWICZ, ROMAN FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN LAW 141-60 (Oxford, 1957).
8.
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other institutions of society. Much of the legislation originating in the Gregorian reform was directed in one way or another to this purpose. 1
Finally, an institutional necessity at once more subtle and more fundamental than these others imparted to the canonical system a certain subsurface dynamism uniquely its own. That was the necessity, inherent in the
nature of the Church, of maintaining at once a corporate witness and a personal apostolate. It is to this necessity that we owe on the one hand the
existence of the canon law in the first place, and on the other hand its often
excruciating failure to live up to one or another of the criteria we set for
a secular legal system. There must be a canon law because the Church is
an institution, the new Israel, gathered by a corporate reception of the Word.
An institution must be governed, a people must have its laws; and government cannot be arbitrary nor can laws be unjust. At the same time, the
rule of law as secular jurisprudence conceives it - a government of laws
and not of men - cannot be fully implemented in the Church because
Christ has entrusted His message to men and not to laws. We cannot expect
to see clearly defined limits of authority because it is man to man, whole man
to whole man, that the Word of God must be proclaimed.
The dynamism imparted to the system by this twofold necessity was not
articulated by the medieval canonist, or in the materials on which he drew.
But we can see it at work in the air of mutual encouragement and moral
exhortation that permeates the legislative work of the councils. We can see
it in the format of the papal decretals that constitute the great bulk of the
medieval additions to the canon law. We can see it in the attitude of the
canonical lawgiver toward his predecessors - the canons of councils held
in other times and places, the traditions of earlier shepherds of the flock.
All of these forms have their counterparts in the Roman law, but there
is something in them that harks back to another tradition - that of the
chain of epistles that linked together the pastoral wisdom and experience of
the primitive church, the words of doctrine and exhortation that passed
continually from one shepherd to another that the whole flock of Christ
might be nourished with the same spiritual food.
The same dynamism may be discerned in the efforts to insure a single
priest for every parish - the very name of parson, persona ecclesiae, is suggestive - and to insure that he be instituted by and in due subordination
to the bishop. This man carries in his person the personal presence of Christ.
But he must enter the sheepfold by the door: otherwise he is a thief and
robber. His personal presence is the presence of the Universal Church.
11.
GERD TELLENBACH, CHURCH, STATE AND CHRISTIAN SOCIETY AT THE TIME OF
THE INVESTITURE CONTEST 115-121 and passim (Bennet trans., Oxford, 1940).
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The same dynamism appears in the machinery of visitation and pastoral
correction. 12 The involved procedures with which offenses are inquired into,
the pastoral solicitude with which offenders are corrected, the public penances with which they are reconciled, seem to involve a delicate - if not
always successful - balancing of the personal character of the pastorate with
the juridical expression of the interest of the Christian community in its
exercise.
II.

THE FUNCTIONAL PROBLEM

IN THE WORKING out of a legal system, the problem we may characterize
as functional is that of introducing into the system elements based on an
awareness of what the system hopes to accomplish, and of what resources
are available for the task. In the medieval canon law, this problem took
the form of a relating of the Roman-law and theological elements in the
system to the institutional necessities of the Church in the context of the
social and political realities of the time, plus the relating of the institutional
necessities themselves to one another according to their relative importance
in the light of the limited means available. As they were articulated by
the canonists, neither the Roman law nor the theology lent itself to the
adequate establishment of such relationships.
In the first place, the Roman law was developed for a society bearing
little relation to the society in which it was revived by the jurists of the
eleventh and twelfth centuries. Early medieval Roman law scholarship had,
therefore, a strongly academic character. 1 3 This character was manifested
both in an emphasis on internal verbal consistency and in an emphasis on
first principles. All of this accorded well enough with the philosophizing
tendency of the times, and contributed to the ethos which the canonists
took from the legists.
Another element in the academic approach of the legists was inherent
in their material. That was the plenitudo potestatis of the Emperor - a
12. The personal character of the pastorate may, incidentally, offer some clue to the
reason for the rule that visitation involves a complete supersession of the authority of the
person visited by that of the visitor. The rule has nothing practical in its favor, and I
have found no rationale offered for it. It is tempting also to attribute to the ethos of the
personal pastorate the phenomenon noted by Professor Jacob of the failure of Archbishop
diocesan, metropolitan,
Chichele's register to note in which of his several capacities the Archbishop does his various acts. I THE REGISTER OF HENRY
papal legate CHICHELE lix-Ixi (Canterbury and York Society, v. 45-47, E. F. Jacob ed., 1943-7).
13.
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perhaps more true of the Bolognese school than of some of the others. Id. 32-58. Nevertheless, it seems a fair characterization of the whole tenor of the Roman law revival;
in any event, it was in Bologna that Gratian did his work.
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power which the canonists took over for the Pope, as we have seen. Plenitudo
potestatis, when attributed to anyone but God is necessarily an academic
concept. A perusal of the Theodosian Code will indicate just how academic
it was in the late imperial period, and how much it bemused the emperors
and diverted them from measures that might have brought actual resources
to bear on the problems of the Empire. Here are examples:
[A.D. 353] We learn that certain veterans, unworthy of that name, are
committing brigandage. We command, therefore, that veterans of good
character shall either till the fields or invest money in honorable business
enterprises and buy and sell goods. But capital punishment shall immediately rise up against [mox in ipsos capitaliter exsurgendum] those
veterans who neither till the land nor spend useful lives in business .... 14
[A.D. 403] We grant by law to provincials the right to overpower deserters,
and if the deserters should dare to resist, We order that punishment
be swift everywhere ....
15
[A.D. 412] We order that all the tribunes who have assumed the duty
of searching out vagrants and deserters throughout Africa shall be removed that they may not devastate the province under a pretext of this
kind. In the future, moreover, We decree that this unholy title and
office must not exist at all throughout Africa, and if anyone should
attempt to aspire to the forbidden rank of this office for the sake of
plunder, he shall be subjected to the severity of capital punishment.... 16
The desperate spiral of severity and anarchy which these enactments bespeak is another part of the canonists' inheritance from the Roman law.
The canonists, despite the formidable practical concerns with which
their system was faced, not only absorbed the academic tendencies of the
legists, but added to them through an ill-considered didacticism in their
theological inputs. Let us take, as an example, the most commonly mentioned instance of their modification of the Roman law in the interest of
a higher conception of justice. This is the rule concerning the requirement
of good faith for prescription.' 7 The Roman law required good faith at
the beginning of the period of prescription - a rule which Gratian was
content to follow. To the later canonists, however, this position seemed to
be a condonation of bad faith during the rest of the period.' 8 Accordingly,
14.

THE THEODOSIAN CODE 7:20:7 (Pharr ed. and trans., Princeton, 1952).

15.
16.

Ibid., 7:18:14.
Ibid., 7:18:17.

17.

RUDOLF SOHM, INSTITUTES sec. 26

(Ledlie trans. p.

139, Oxford,

1907); Charles

Lefebvre, Natural Equity and Canonical Equity, 8 NATURAL LAW FORUM 122, 130 (1963).
18. R. Naz, Priscription, 7 DDC 178, 194.
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a decretal of Alexander III adopted the rule that there must be good faith
throughout the period. 19 Finally, at the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215,
an attempt was made to amend the civil law rule as well, on the ground
that "every constitution or custom is to be done away with which cannot
be observed without mortal sin." 20 The attempt to modify the civil law was
unsuccessful, but the modification of the canon law was maintained, and
the two systems continue to differ on the point.21
Now, the role of prescription in a legal system, as the Roman jurisconsults evidently knew well enough, is not to render abstract justice between
competing claims, but to preserve the generality of legal interests against
the uncertainties of litigation:
Prescription was brought in for the public good, lest the titles to
certain things be long or well nigh permanently uncertain, whereas the
time laid down in the law would have been sufficient to allow the owners
22
to seek their property.
Whether the requirement of good faith at the outset is consistent with such
a value is debatable - rights will still be subject to the vicissitudes of judicial
proof involving matters long past. But the inquiry is at least confined to a
point of time, and will in many cases involve transactions of some notoriety.
The canonical rule, expanding the inquiry over a period of many years, must
vastly increase the uncertainty of the outcome, and therefore the insecurity
with which rights are enjoyed.
The possibilities of the wrong side winning a lawsuit, particularly a lawsuit that turns on obscure and often forgotten matters of fact, are such that
this insecurity must affect the just and the unjust alike. This risk is the very
raison d'etre of any principle of prescription, and it was just this that was
ignored by the didacticism of the canonists. To put it another way, the
abstract pursuit of justice was allowed to overshadow the necessities of the
concrete pursuit of justice through the mechanics of a legal system.
The same didacticism affected other aspects of the canonical system,
albeit not always in as obvious ways. We see it, for instance, in the area of
appellate procedure where the canon law seems to show less concern than
either the Roman law or the medieval English law with using appeals to
elicit the best decision the system is capable of affording, more with using

19.
20.
21.
22.

C. 5, X, II, 26.
Can. 41, 4 Lateran 1215, 22 MANSI 1027, c. 20, X, II, 26.
Naz, loc. cit. supra note 18.
Gaius in DiGEST bk. 41, title 3, law 1.
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23
it for the utopian purpose of affording a decision that is abstractly right.
The combination of this didacticism with the plenitudo potestatis put
at the apex of the canonical system an image that made it impossible to
distribute power effectively between central and local agencies. On the one
hand, the acceptance of the plenitudo potestatis (which, we must note, is
rather an oversimplification of the relation between papal and episcopal
authority in Catholic theology) 24 thrust into the background the theological
claims of decentralized authority by giving them no satisfactory juridical
formulation. On the other hand, the strictly practical claims of decentralization were vitiated by the image of the Pope as Peter. Peter was not the
head of the largest administrative organization in Europe; he was the Prince
of the Apostles, the Shepherd of the Sheep. If a sheep came to Peter hungry,
25
how could Peter not feed him?
It seems to be a principle of this kind that Barraclough has discerned
at work in the proliferation of papal provisions to benefices. 2 6 He insists
that this development stemmed from no set purpose of the popes to increase their authority as against the local episcopate, but was rather their
response to the importunity of those seeking provisions - a response motivated in great part by the maxim provisio clericorum opus in se continet
pietatis. Barraclough seems to consider it, if anything, to the credit of the
popes that their undermining of the episcopal authority was unintentional.

23. For a good example of the ambivalent attitude of the canonists toward appeals, see
can. 6, 3 Lateran 1179, 22 MANSI 220-1, c. 26, X, II, 28. For the difficulties encountered
in their attempts to control appeals in the light of this ambivalent attitude, see A. Amanieu,
Appellatione Remota, 1 DDC 827. It is presumably due to the utopian aspirations of
the canonists that they never developed an appellate procedure that would focus on
the proceeding appealed from rather than on the merits of the case. See CALENDAR OF
ENTRIES
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REG.], where the Pope, even though his authority is invoked for improper motives, takes
over a case from the local ordinary, and deals with it through judges delegate.
24. It is well established theologically that the power of the bishop to govern his diocese
is of divine law. The relation between this principle and the equally well-established
principle of the primacy of the pope has given rise to some fine-spun controversies in its
time. For a description of one of them, see Claeys-Bouuaert, Rviques, 5 DDC 569, 571-3.
There continues to be no really satisfactory way of structuring the theological relation
juridically. The plenitudo potestatis of the pope is, as I say, an oversimplification. Maitland's analogy of a federal system will not do, because there is no allocation of powers
or functions between central and local authority. I suspect that the analogy actually used
was that of the relation between the Roman people and the other peoples of the Empire.
25. See DECRETUM c. 4, 8, 10, C II, q. 6, especially c. 8 (attributed by Gratian to Pope
Zephyrinus [199-217]):
To the Roman Church everyone - but especially those who are oppressed - may
appeal, may run as to a mother, to be nourished at her breasts, to be defended by
her authority, to be relieved of his oppression, for a mother neither can nor should
forget her son.
26. GEOFFRY BARRACLOUGH, PAPAL PROVISIONS ch. 12 (Oxford, 1935).
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But that so profound a change could be effected without anyone in control
of it does not speak well for the system.
We could multiply examples of the same kind, but let one more suffice.
A canon enacted at Amalfi in 1089 and again at Rome in 1099 reads as
follows:
Let no layman presume to offer his tithes, any church, or anything else
of ecclesiastical right to monasteries or canons without the consent of
the bishop or the permission of the Roman Pontiff. If the bishop refuses
his consent through avarice or improbity, let the Roman Pontiff be in27
formed, and let whatever is to be offered be offered with his permission.
As the Pope is obviously not able to read the interior dispositions of the
bishop, the practical meaning of this provision can only be that the Pope
stands ready to substitute his judgment for that of the bishop in cases of
this kind, and invites the laity to bring such cases to his attention so that
he may do so. The effect, in short, is to add one more piece to the pattern
2
of centralization without any articulated purpose of doing So. 8
To sum up what I have said thus far, it seems that the Roman law inputs into the canonical system tended to be academic, and the theological
inputs tended to be didactic, so that both militated against an effective
allocation of administrative resources for institutional needs. Turning next
to the institutional inputs into the system, we find that these were articulated in terms of a "High Church" ethos, which tended to regard the upholding of the rights and position of the institutional Church as an end in
itself, rather than as a means of disseminating the Gospel and administering
the sacraments. This point of view put solid theological props under the
diversion of resources from the pastoral ministry to other institutional goals,
while the academic and didactic character of the rest of the system militated
against the giving of effective consideration to the competing claims of the
29
ministry.
For an example of this process at work, let us consider the subject of
27.
28.

Can. 5, Amalfi 1089, 20 MANSI 723; can. 15, Rome 1099, 20 MANSI 963.
See also the discussion infra p. 71 of Ottobuono's canon on monastic appropriations.

29.
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immunity, rather than for disseminating the Gospel message. The extent to which an
institution devotes its resources to its own maintenance rather than to the task it is being
maintained in order to perform is a test of its efficiency - and a test by which the medieval
church was seriously deficient.

But to the extent one adopts the High Church ethos, one

regards the institutional Church, representing as it does the presence of Christ in the
community, as having its mere existence as one of its goals. Under this criterion, it cannot

be accused of inefficiency by reason of the high proportion of its resources devoted to the
furtherance of this goal.
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monastic appropriations. The law on this subject as it ultimately developed 3 0
was that a monastery or other clerical body that held the right of patronage
of a parish church could not under the general law serve the parish cure
through one of its own number, but would have to present a suitable cleric
to be parson - just as a lay patron would have to do. With a license from
the bishop or the Pope, however, the monastic or collegiate patron could
"appropriate" the parish church. When this was done, there would be
provided out of the sources of revenue of the parish benefice a sufficient endowment to maintain a "vicar" to serve the cure, and the rest of the revenues would go to the appropriating body. The endowment of the vicar would
be sufficient to afford him a "congrua sustentatio" - a minimum amount
sufficient for decent if frugal living.31 A license of this kind was not to be
given as a matter of course; it required a showing of poverty on the part of
the monastery or college seeking to appropriate.
At first blush these rules look reasonable enough. They fail, however,
to focus our attention on the crucial questions of what resources are available and how they can be distributed to do the most good. If we look separately at the requirements of the parish ministry and at the requirements of
the monastery, we will find that we have a standard for evaluating each.
But we entirely lack a standard for looking at both and deciding between
them.
Let us see how the elements we have been considering contributed to this
state of the law. In the first place, it was "High Church" concern with institutional dignity that gave content to the two criteria to be applied: for a
monastery to be impoverished was an affront to religion, and the revenues of
the church might appropriately be applied to alleviating it;32 for a parish
33
priest to lack a congrua sustentatio was an affront to the clerical order.
Next, it was didacticism that made it a pious work to grant the petition
of the monastery if the requisite poverty was shown. 34 It was didacticism also
that led to requiring the vicar to content himself with a congrua sustentatio.
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This concept is discussed at length in PHILIP HANNAN, THE CANONICAL CONCEPT
OF Congrua Sustentatio FOR THE SECULAR CLERGY (Washington, 1950).
32. MOORMAN, op. cit. supra note 30, at 39; A. H. THOMPSON, THE ENGLISH CLERGY
AND THEIR ORGANIZATION IN THE LATER MIDDLE AGES 110 (Oxford, 1947). [Hereafter
cited as THOMPSON]
33. See can. 15, Oxford 1222, 22 MANSI 1156.
34. See Ottobuono's canon on the subject, cited infra note 85.
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One who has chosen Christ for his portion must partake sparingly of the
35
things of this world.
Finally, it was the academic approach that prevented an evaluation of these
rules in the light of what they were actually doing in the Church - of what
kind of man would actually be willing to serve for the sum fixed upon as a
congrua sustentatio;3 6 of whether the poverty of the monastery could be as
well alleviated by cutting down its commitments as by increasing its revenues.
In fact, low pay had a good deal to do with drawing the best trained priests
out of the parish ministry, and the monasteries were so faithful to Parkinson's
Second Law (expenditure rises to meet income) 37 that by the end of the
Middle Ages they had appropriated over one-third of the parishes in England 38 without being significantly better off financially - to say nothing of
spiritually - than they were before.
In general, then, the academic and didactic propensities of the canonists
led them to consider their system in terms of the articulation of consistent
principles, when they would have done better to consider it in terms of
choice between conflicting principles in the light of available resources. This
approach hampered the functional development of the system at a number
of points. It also gave to the "High Church" zeal for institutional status
more scope than it would have had if it had been squarely faced with the
competing claims of the parish ministry. The canon law in its formative
period was not without its functional successes - cases in which the available
resources and techniques were effectively marshalled for the achievement
of the task at hand. But it had its great failures also, and these resulted in
no small part from the inadequacies in the canonists' approach to the problem
of function.
II.

THE PROBLEM OF OBLIGATION
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Can. 32, 4 Lateran 1215, 22
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1019, c. 50, X, III, 5 seems to recognize that

the lack of a congrua sustentatio may produce an illiterate ministry. But to recognize this
is not to recognize that there may be a scale of literary attainments available in proportion
to the amount we are willing to pay, and that it is our business to strike a balance
at some particular point on the scale. The existence of such a scale was so far recognized
that a number of the medieval commentators taught that higher pay was to be given
for higher attainments (i.e., that a congrua sustentatio for a better man might be higher
than for a worse) (HANNAN, op. cit. supra note 31, at 54), but they did not draw from
this fact the logical deduction that higher pay would elicit a more highly qualified man

for a given post.
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38. DAVID KNOWLES, THE RELIGIOUS ORDERS IN ENGLAND 291 (Cambridge, 1955).
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in a given system is ultimately to raise the question of the definition of law,
or as some modern authors would have it, the question of what we mean
when we assert that such-and-such is the law. 39 The answers given to this
age-old question tend to fall into three main categories. The first- the
earliest in point of time, and perhaps the most prevalent even today - would
answer in terms of some moral claim to obedience: the law imposes a moral
obligation on the subject, because it represents the command of someone
whom a relevant principle of morality requires us to obey. 40 The second
category of answer - one that gained currency in its present form around
the end of the last century, and continues to exert a powerful hold on legal
scholars in America - would reduce legal principles to empirical predictions. Thus, the statement that such-and-such is the law is a prediction that
certain public officials will react in a certain way to the situation envisaged:
the statement that the law requires me to do such-and-such is a prediction
that certain consequences will be visited upon me if I do not.4 1 The third
category of answer, articulated for the most part by a school of contemporary
English philosophers, would have it that statements about the law are not
reducible to statements about anything outside the legal system to which
they apply. Thus, although from a statement that such-and-such is the
law there may in some cases be deduced a statement about moral obligations,
or a prediction about the behavior of public officials, the statement itself
42
is not identical with either of these.
The arguments advanced by each of these schools of thought against
the others are many and complicated; I shall not attempt to follow them
here. But let us note that the inherent characteristics of a secular legal system
are such as to give some measure of support to each. The law does carry
with it a certain moral suasion. It is by and large brought home to the subject through predictable actions of public officials. It does have an internally

39. H. L. A. Hart, Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence, 70 LAW QUARTERLY REVIEW
37 (1954).
40. A number of opinions having this approach in common are collected in THOMAS
DAVITT, THE NATURE OF LAW (St. Louis, 1951). This school of thought would
generally impose some moral limitation on the substantive content of law, as well as on
the authority of its author. While it is theoretically possible to hold that the mandates of
one morally authorized to make laws are morally binding regardless of content, there
seems to be no responsible Western jurist who does so hold. Thomas Broden, The Straw
Man of Legal Positivism, 34 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 503 (1959). To say that the moral
suasion of the law is limited by its content is, of course, a far cry from saying that the
moral suasion of the law is derived from its content - that a legal principle must in some
way restate a moral principle.
41.
0. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 457 (1897),
is generally regarded as the cornerstone of this school.
42. Hart, supra note 39. Kelsen's "pure theory of Law" seems to amount to rather the
same thing.
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consistent formal structure that may extend to cases where moral suasion
or public enforcement are lacking.
To some extent, the canonical system lends itself to similar kinds of
analysis. It too has elements of moral suasion, official enforcement, and formal
structure. Yet the character of the obligation imposed by the canon law is
not easily expressed within the framework of these theories developed to
define the secular law. With these secular theories in mind, an analysis of
obligation in the canonical system may yield some insight into its unique
43
character.
As a vehicle for such an analysis, let us consider the canon De multa
of the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215. This canon deals with an important
subject - the holding of plural benefices - and therefore forms part of a
substantial course of legislation and administration addressed to the same
subject. 4 4 It also gathers in one place an unusually large collection of the
typical devices of the canonical legislation of the period; thus, it will give
us a convenient starting point for studying these devices in context. I will
begin by setting forth a translation of the whole canon; then, under certain
of the key phrases of the canon, I will take up one by one the various devices
of which it makes use, setting each in a context that may shed some light on
the nature of the obligation this canon - and, inferentially, the whole system - sought to impose. Our concern here, it should be noted, is not with
the interpretation of the canon, and therefore not with the work of those
commentators who concerned themselves with delineating the exact scope of
what it commanded and what it forbade. The question before us is the nature of the obligation it imposed on the subject to do what it commanded or
to refrain from what it forbade, and the consequences it boded for him if
he did otherwise. For this purpose, it is on the course of legislation and administration, rather than on the course of interpretation and comment, to
which the canon gives rise that I have focused.
Here, then, is a translation of the canon in question:
With much foresight [De multa providentia] it was forbidden in the
[Third, 1179] Lateran Council that anyone should receive different
ecclesiastical dignities and several parish churches, contrary to what was
43. For the basic recognition that the methods and purposes of canon law differ inherently from those of secular law, I am indebted to E. W. KEMP, op. cit. supra note 1.
See also R. C. MORTIMER, WESTERN CANON LAW 75-90 (Berkeley, 1953).
44. The fullest treatment of this topic is A. H. Thompson, Pluralism in the Medieval
Church, 33 Assoc. ARCHITECTURAL Soc. REp. AND PAPERS 35 (1915). For more accessible material, see THOMPSON 11-12; W. H. PANTIN, THE ENGLISH CHURCH IN THE
FOURTEENTH CENTURY 36-8 (Cambridge, 1955) [hereafter cited as PANTIN]. For the continuity of the problem in England after the Reformation, see NORMAN SYKES, CHURCH
AND STATE IN ENGLAND IN THE XVIIITH CENTURY 147-9, 215-20 (Cambridge, 1934).

NATURAL LAW FORUM
laid down in the sacred canons [contra sacrorum canonum instituta].
Otherwise, the person receiving such dignities and churches was to lose
them, and the person bestowing them was to lose his right of conferring
them. Since, however, because of the cupidity and presumption of certain persons, this statute has thus far borne little or no fruit, we, wishing more openly and expressly to oppose this practice, establish by the
present decree that whoever receives any benefice having cure of souls
annexed to it, shall be deprived by the law itself of any such benefice
that he may have obtained earlier. If by chance he should strive to retain
the earlier benefice, he shall be deprived [spolietur] of the second as well.
Furthermore, he to whom the bestowal of the earlier benefice belongs, may, as soon as the second is received, freely bestow the first on
anyone he considers deserving of it. If he puts off bestowing it for longer
than six months, not only shall the collation of it devolve upon another
in accordance with the statute of the Lateran Council [not the canon
referred to in the preamble], but he whose benefice it is shall be compelled to assign for the use of the church so much of the fruits as he is
found to have received during the time it was vacant.
We order that the same rule be observed in the case of parsonages
[personatibus = prebends?], adding that no one is to have more than one
prebend or dignity in the same church, even if he does not have cure of
souls.
As to sublime and literate persons, however, who ought to be honored
with greater benefices, a dispensation can be had from the Apostolic
45
See when reason demands.
A. With much foresight it was forbidden in the Lateran Council . . .
contrary to what was laid down in the sacred canons.-Not only do the
fathers, in framing this canon, appeal for support to the provision of the
1179 council on the same subject, they also quote directly the words by which
the framers of the latter provision appeal in their turn to the authority of
those who have gone before. The principle that an old law is better than
a new law was traditional and pervasive in the canonical system. It can be
seen at work in the first synod of the English Church, assembled by Theodore
of Tarsus in 673.46 In the early medieval canons it takes the form sometimes of lifting canons verbatim from one synod to another, more often of
referring to earlier canons for justification or authority: "Following in the
footsteps of the holy fathers, we command. . . -147 "As is provided in the
holy canons, let the bishop have. .. "48 "That which was laid down in the
45.
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holy Council of Chalcedon, we order to be unswervingly adhered to, to wit,
that. . .
In context, it seems fairly clear that the purpose of these references to
the past is justification - by them the proposed disposition is grounded in
the tradition and experience of the Church.
B. Because of the cupidity and presumption of certain persons . . .
The moral vituperation of those who have acted otherwise in the past is
another form of justification which the canons frequently offer for themselves. This vituperation may be simple, as it is here, or fortified by reasons
as in the 1179 canon on the same subject:
Whereas many, not
diverse ecclesiastical
what was laid down
for one office, they

setting a limit to their avarice, attempt to acquire
dignities and several parish churches, contrary to
in the sacred canons, so that, being scarcely sufficient
assume the emoluments of several . . .50

There may be a reference to scripture:
If anyone goes against this rule (for it is against the doctrine of the
Apostle who says that no soldier of God concerns himself with secular
things) and behaves in a secular way, let him be put out of the ministry,
since, neglecting his clerical office he immerses himself in the currents
of worldly things in order to please the powers of the world. 5 '
Sometimes the reasons given are fanciful:
It is good for seed to be multiplied to the sower, but ridiculous to reap
where one has not sown, therefore . . .5
Usually, as in the instant canon and in the 1179 one, there is a vice to
which the behavior in question is attributed:
Many
to...

. .

. have been led by levity, or, what is worse, by cupidity

53

Prefatory material of this kind is, of course, part and parcel of the
49. Can. 5, 2 Lateran 1139, 21 MANsi 527.
50. Can. 13, 3 Lateran 1179, 22 MANSi 225, c. 3, X, III, 4.
51. Can. 12, 3 Lateran 1179, 22 MANSi 225, c. 4, X, III, 50. See also can. 7 of the
same council, 22 MANs! 221-2: "Should anyone presume to violate this, let him know
that he shall have his lot with Giezi whose deed he imitates by his wicked exaction."
52. Can. 19 of Ottobuono's, London 1268, 23 MANS! 1234. The subject is the acceptance of procurations by a visitor when he has not visited.
53. Can. 5, Rheims 1157, 21 MANsi 844.
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didactic tendency I have already referred to as a major element in
canons of the period. This didacticism is peculiar to the canon law,
goes considerably beyond the moral element that is necessarily present in
viable legal system. Consider by way of contrast the preamble to the
secular statute enacted in England on the subject of plural benefices:

the
and
any
first

For the more quiet and virtuous increase and maintenance of divine
service, the preaching and teaching the word of God, with godly and
good example, the better discharge of curates, the maintenance of hospitality, the relief of poor people, the increase of devotion, and good
opinion of the lay-fee toward the spiritual persons, be it enacted . . . 4
This too is an attempt to build a statute on a moral foundation, but here
the moral basis is not the sinfulness of the behavior the statute is going to
forbid; rather, it is the right ordering of the whole society. This difference
between the secular legislator and the canonical legislator in the moral
justifications they advance for what they enact is fairly constant. There are
exceptions in both cases, but generally the canons look for justification to
some immorality or vice involved in what they forbid, whereas the secular
laws look for justification to the good social consequences of what they command or the evil social consequences of what they forbid. Specifically, one
would have to search the canons at length to find one on plural benefices
that took the social evils of the practice more seriously than the avarice of
55
the cleric that engaged in it.
54. 21 Henry VIII c. 13 (1529). This, to be sure, is relatively late, as the secular
authorities did not address themselves to the subject of pluralism before Henry VIII's
time. The rhetorical style, however, does not differ from that of earlier English secular
statutes.
55. Sometimes the references to social evils are inextricably intertwined with moral
vituperations. Here is the introduction to Ottobuono's canon on pluralism, can. 30, London

1268, 23 MANSI 1241:
The truth of the Christian religion has so far forsaken many in their self-exaltation
that, whereas each man is scarcely sufficient for the care of his own soul, these deceitfully think themselves equal to more than one. Not only do they rashly undertake
the cure of many souls in one benefice - where they do not reside, nor do they
receive the orders the cure requires - but they also impudently gather to themselves
innumerable additional cures. Walking in the ways of falsehood, foolishness and
vanity, they neglect the necessities of the miserable souls whose cure they have
undertaken - for, by the very impossibility of the thing, they cannot fulfil such
an obligation. Indeed, the constitutions, ancient and modern of the holy fathers,
the Roman Pontiffs, and of others in authority, have labored with great solicitude
to extricate from such perils these men who thus align themselves with the flesh
against the spirit, against God, and against neighbor; men who, as if of set purpose,
turn their backs on God and openly precipitate themselves into the hands of the
devil; men who bear away souls from Christ; men who with unspeakable perversity
divert the sustenance of the poor to superfluous, not to say evil, uses.
The author then points out that these efforts to combat the practice, meritorious as they
were on the part of those who engaged in them, have not succeeded in checking the
cupidity of the pluralists, who continue to amass plural benefices, without papal dispen-
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C. Since . . . this statute has thus far borne little or no fruit we, wishing more openly and expressly to oppose this practice, establish by the present decree . . . The interrelation of the different canons that make up a

series of provisions on the same subject is probably the most difficult question that faces us in attempting to subject the canon law to any systematic
legal analysis.
Let us note in the first place that the crucial consideration for us - the
change made in the previous law - appears from the wording of the canon

to be of secondary concern to the legislator. Indeed, by omitting a significant
portion from his paraphrase of the 1179 canon, he has made it look more
like his own than it actually is. 5 6 This result accords very well with his stated
purpose, which is to add his own authority to that of his predecessor because
the latter has not received the attention it deserves. He has added a sanction,
but that seems to be only by way of pointing up his renewal of the basic
prohibition.
This approach explains, if anything can, a puzzling incident recorded
in the Register of Hugh of Wells, who held the see of Lincoln at the time
of the Fourth Lateran Council. Hugh appears to have been particularly
zealous in inquiring into the qualifications of persons presented to benefices
in his diocese. So it is that we find him inquiring of the papal legate Gualo
whether a certain pluralist was ineligible. The legate replied that he was
sation, and often without the institution of their own prelates. He then proceeds to explore
more at large the evils of the practice:
We are not adequate to recount how many evils arise from this practice. For the
honor of the Church is stained, her authority brought to nought. The faith of Christ
is thrown to the ground. Charity is driven into exile. The 'hope of the poor perishes
as they see every benefice which they might enter when it falls vacant open to the
rich or to the powerful. Some blind and miserable sinner, proclaiming himself rector,
receives, or rather steals, what is not his own. Furthermore, among the rich themselves scandals arise, hatred and litigation are nourished.
Here too, it seems fair to say that the predominant theme is one of moral condemnation
of the pluralist, rather than practical undesirability of pluralism. Furthermore, the social
evils complained of seem to be evils in the internal functioning of the institutional Church,
rather than in its ability to do its work. In other words, the main social evil complained
of is a deterioration of the moral character of the institution, rather than a deterioration
of its practical effectiveness. Finally, it is particularly interesting to note that the
purpose attributed to the earlier legislation is not the more effective discharge of the cure,
but the moral rehabilitation of the pluralist. Thus it would seem that the social evils of
the practice are conceived of as aggravating the moral offense of those who engage in it,
rather than as in themselves justifying the legislation.
56. The 1179 canon, cited supra note 50, provides that benefices are to be committed
to such persons as will reside and serve the cures in person. The sanction referred to in
the 1215 paraphrase applies to violators of this clause, and not to violators of the
prohibition against pluralism as the paraphrase would indicate. It should be noted in this
regard that when the Decretals were compiled the 1215 canon was inserted in the title
De Prebendis, to serve as the canon on pluralism, whereas the 1179 one was inserted in
the title De Clericis non Residentibus, to serve as the canon against nonresidence, although
in fact it dealt with both topics.
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not ineligible because he was presented before the Council - the implication
being that no law that would make him ineligible was enacted until that
council. 5 7 What is curious about this is that our 1215 canon - which must
be the one to which the legate refers - does not make a beneficed cleric
ineligible to receive a new benefice; it provides that his acceptance of the
new benefice will automatically oust him from the old. On the other hand,
the 1179 canon, although not perfectly clear on the point, would seem to be
58
rather good authority for not instituting a man into a second benefice.
Presumably, then, it was considered unduly harsh to enforce the 1179 canon
at this late date, but a person subject to the 1215 canon could not complain
if the means adopted for dealing with him was different from that laid
down in the canon. 59
The legate Ottobuono attempted in 1268 to regularize the enforcement
device adopted by Hugh, and to integrate it with the 1215 canon. He provided that before a man was instituted into a benefice there should in every
case be an inquiry as to whether he held any other benefice with cure of
souls. 60 If it appeared that he had such a benefice, he was not to be instituted
into the new one unless he showed a valid dispensation. Any institution in
violation of these provisions was to be automatically void.
These provisions were integrated with the 1215 canon by means of an
exception whereby the cleric could be instituted into the new benefice if
he would take an oath not in any way to concern himself with his old
benefice or benefices after institution into the new. For breach of this oath,
he was to be automatically deprived of both old and new benefices.
57.
1 ROTULI HUGONIS DE WELLES (1209-35)
26 (Canterbury and York Soc. v. 1,
W. P. W. Phillimore ed., 1905).
58. Under the 1179 canon, instituting a man into a second benefice would make him
de jure as well as de facto a pluralist - which he is not allowed to be - whereas under
the 1215 canon institution into the second benefice would automatically deprive him of the
first, so that he would not be in violation of any law unless he attempted to hold onto
the first as well. Note also that the 1179 canon would seem to call for refusing institution to a man who does not plan to reside. See note 56 supra. It is so interpreted by
Alexander III in c. 4, X, III, 4. As a man who already has another benefice would seem
more than likely to be not planning to reside on this one, this principle might support
refusing institution to the pluralist.
59. A mystery comparable to that discussed in text is presented by Hugh's treatment of
a presentee who kept a concubine, but had been presented before the promulgation of
the council.

ROT. HUGH OF WELLS, supra note 57, at 87.

A case could be made out

for attributing the different treatment of persons presented after the 1215 council to can.
30 of that council, 22 MANSI 1018, which seems to be the first express recognition by a
general council of the bishop's right to refuse a person duly presented to a benefice on
the ground that he is not fit. But as this canon has some rather harsh things to say
about bishops who have been admitting unfit men, we will raise more problems than
we resolve if we suggest that the bishops thus castigated had no authority to do otherwise.
In any event, the 1179 canon on pluralism would seem to authorize refusing pluralists
regardless of the law on other undesirable presentees.
60. Can. 30, London 1268, 23 MANSI 1241.
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Again, from a contemporary standpoint, we would look at this enactment as calculated to plug loopholes by the addition of new sanctions. But this
view of the legislation is not what emerges from a reading of the preamble.
This preamble is too long to quote in full, 6 1 but the following may give

an idea of what the legate conceived himself to be about. He describes the
evils, moral and to some extent social, of the practice condemned, refers to
the unremitting efforts of Roman pontiffs and others in authority to combat
it, expresses fear lest it bring down the wrath of God on whole kingdoms,
then says:
Wishing, therefore, to exert our authority diligently against this pestilent
and almost incurable disease, and, as much as it is in our power, to cure
it, following also in the footsteps of the said legate [Otto in 1237]62
strengthening [adjuvantes] his constitution on this subject, and adding
to it, we command...
Certainly the new enforcement procedures are for the author of this canon
an important part of what he has accomplished with it. It seems, however,
an oversimplification to say that he has simply added new enforcement procedures to a canon that previously lacked them. For him, the most important
thing he has done is to add his efforts to those of his predecessors, and strike
one more blow in the never-ending battle against avarice.
This appears to be the way Archbishop Pecham looks at the work of
Ottobuono when he comes to enact his own legislation on the subject at
Reading in 1279.63 Pecham begins in the usual way by vituperating the

practice of pluralism and by referring to the canons that have addressed
themselves to the subject in the past without success. He then points out that
the 1215 and 1268 canons taken together would deprive the pluralist of
all his benefices - the 1215 canon reaching all but the last and the 1268
canon reaching that one. 64 He determines, however, to temper justice with
mercy, and allow those who presently hold plural benefices to keep the last
61. A good deal of it is quoted supra note 55.
62. Otto had contented himself with a reference to the 1215 canon and those who
presumed to imperil their salvation by violating it, saying that it seemed to him to be
more a matter of enforcing what had been laid down than of setting forth new sanctions.
Can. 13, London 1237, 23 MANSi 454.
63. Can. 1, Reading 1279, 24 MANSi 257.
64. A literal reading of the two canons in question would seem not to yield this result.
The deprivation of the first benefice under the 1215 canon appears to depend on a de
jure institution into the second benefice, which the 1268 canon would prevent from
taking place if the requisite inquiries are not made. If, on the other hand, the requisite
inquiries are made, but fail to disclose the existence of the first benefice, the 1268 canon
appears not to invalidate the institution into the second. Rather, the first is lost by force
of the 1215 canon, and the second is legitimately held. In fact, however, no analyses of
this kind seem to have been applied to these canons. This fact provides some additional
evidence that their provisions as to sanctions were not to be literally carried out.
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one taken, although he promises to be less lenient in the future. He adds
also an automatic excommunication for those who continue to attempt to
hold onto their plural benefices.
In 1281, however, we find Pecham temporizing again. In a canon
promulgated at Lambeth in that year, 65 he refers to the threats he made at
an earlier time (presumably in 1279) and states that he means by God's
help to carry them out, so that by God's help the evil of pluralism will
gradually be driven out of his province. In support of his policy of gradualism,
he quotes Deuteronomy 7.22:
He will consume these nations in thy sight by little and little and by
degrees. Thou wilt not be able to destroy them altogether; lest perhaps
the beasts of the earth should increase upon thee.
For the implementation of his policy, he refers to those pluralists who, smitten
with terror or remorse by his previous enactment, have turned in their excess
benefices, and orders all others to do the same within six months. If they fail
to do so, he will "proceed canonically" against them. Even if they do submit,
they must make satisfaction for their past violations, "so that their character
66
may be understood by the churches they have thus defrauded."
Without carrying any farther the involved history of the canons against
pluralism, we may perhaps find some basis for generalizing about the interrelation of the canons in the series. The following general principles seem
to be those that emerge:
1. The most important role of the canons of earlier times is in constituting a tradition on the subject, to which tradition the current legislator
can appeal.
2. A canon that has been widely disregarded for a period of time requires some kind of renewal before it can properly be put into effect.
This principle is not reducible to the rule that a law can be abrogated
by contrary custom, 67 because the principle obtains even where the

contrary custom is grievously sinful, and even where it has not been
followed for the period prescribed by the rule.
3. This renewal is generally accompanied by some kind of advance

65. Can. 25, Lambeth 1281, 23 MANSI 419.
66. ". . . ut eorum status Patitur ecclesiis sic fraudatis." The provision as to satisfaction
for past violation seems to be an innovation.
67.
See A. Van Hove, Cofitume, 4 DDC 731, for a discussion of the circumstances under
which canonists, medieval and modern, will allow a custom to have the force of law in
their system.
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warning, so that those who have violated it with impunity in the
past may be given an opportunity to mend their ways. The same
principle is presumably responsible for the provision some canons
68
make for being read from time to time to those to whom they apply.
4. The renewal is accomplished through a renewed exercise of personal
leadership, of which the promulgation of a new canon or the devising of new enforcement procedures is only evidentiary. This
principle seems to represent an irreducible element in the Christian
pastorate, breaking through the juridical forms with which it is
surrounded; it explains much that is perplexing in the canon law.
To it may be attributed not only the attrition of canons in the course
of time and the secondary importance of the sanctions adopted
from time to time, but also such seeming superfluities as a bishop
coming home from a general council and enacting its canons in his
diocesan synod, 6 9 or a pope issuing a special indult for the application
70
of a general law.
These principles, like so much else in the medieval canon law, relate finally
to the characteristic didacticism of the system. They form the basis for the
imposition of a moral ideal through the exercise of pastoral solicitude.
D. Shall be deprived by the law itself.-We have already noticed that

See, e.g., can. 5, Reading 1279, 24 MANSI 263-4:
Since the vice of incontinence stains and lamentably dishonors the clergy, to the
scandal of many, we order that the statute of the lord Ottobuono against concubinary clerics be inviolably kept in all its rigor. And lest vicious minds be
darkened by the contagion of crime, and lest such men be enabled to excuse themselves by ignorance or forgetfulness, we command all archdeacons . . . that they
have the said constitution carefully and openly recited . . . in the four principal
rural chapters of the year, before the entire chapter, with the laity excluded. This
recitation we wish to have taken as a monition, so that all those who are given
to this vice may be freely proceeded against, and when proceedings are taken to
execute the sentence of deprivation to which the statute automatically subjects them,
they may not seek to defend themselves on the ground that they have not been
warned.
69. On this process as regards the dissemination in England of the canons of the Fourth
Lateran Council of 1215, see MARION GIBBS & JANE LANG, BISHOPS AND REFORM
1215-1272 (Oxford, 1934).
70. The indult says, "to be sure, it may seem superfluous to seek a special concession
concerning that which is conceded by the common law. Since, however, it is customary to
stand more in awe of that which is conceded by special indulgences than of what is
disposed of by general law . . . " This is an indult of Innocent IV to the Dean and
Chapter of Lincoln, dated 1247, and authorizing them when their churches are visited
to furnish no procurations for the visitor's retainers beyond the number allowed by the
canon issued on the subject in the Third Lateran Council of 1179. 1 REoIsTRum ANTIQUISSIMUM 213, Document No. 260 (Lincoln Record Society v. 27, Foster and Major,
eds., 1931).
68.

NATURAL LAW FORUM

the prelates who addressed themselves to the subject of pluralism on the
scene in England preferred other sanctions to the automatic one laid down
in the 1215 canon. 71 It remains for us to consider the subject of automatic
effect a little more at large. It was a favorite - and not usually very
felicitous - device of the medieval canonical legislators.
The first thing we must note about this kind of legislative device is its
metaphorical quality. In sober fact the law itself deprives no one of anything. There is a particular man drawing down the fruits of a particular
benefice, and he will go on doing so until someone persuades or compels
him to stop. Whether or not the law purported to have automatic effect,
the task of persuasion or compulsion would in the ordinary course of events
devolve upon the bishop or the archdeacon or someone exercising authority
under them.
This work would sometimes be hampered by lack of zeal - for pluralism
was the lifeblood of the clerical bureaucracy of which the bishop and the
archdeacon were a part 72 - and would always be hampered by lack of information. The record-keeping techniques of the day did not furnish any
regular means whereby a pluralist might be expected to come to the attention of the authorities. Generally speaking, a document respecting a man's
affairs would be in the possession of the individual concerned. An important
technical advance, rather widespread by the time we are considering, was
the keeping of a copy of the document in its chronological order in the
records of the official who issued it. But the only person in a position to furnish
a dossier of all the documents affecting a particular cleric would be that
cleric himself. If he had been instituted into two different benefices, the
ecclesiastical authorities would have no record of this fact except that represented by two entries in the registers, completely isolated from one another.
The inquest envisioned by Ottobuono's canon on the subject was presumably
calculated to make up for this lack of records by the eliciting of live evidence.
But the inquest would not have served the purpose unless the inquirer knew
71. It should be noted also that the provision for automatic effect did not prevent the
papacy itself from making use of other sanctions on occasion. Note in this regard the
retention in the Decretals of a decision of Alexander III (c. 7, X, III, 5) allowing the
pluralist to choose which of his benefices he will keep. See also I CAL. PAPAL REG. 247
(1247) containing a papal mandate to the Bishop of Bath and Wells to compel certain
pluralists to resign their excess benefices. The case of Richard Tittesbury, cited infra note
75, suggests that resignation and automatic deprivation were not considered mutually
exclusive, as we would consider them. Evidently the modem distinction between de jure
and de facto tenure was not fully worked out at the time.
72. See PANTIN 30-46. Presumably, as the system of plural benefices for members of the
bureaucracy was brought more thoroughly under the central direction of the papacy, the
pluralist who lacked the necessary papal dispensation would be more apt to be a stranger
to the bureaucratic elite represented by the authorities charged with bringing him to
book. Cf. THOMPSON 12, and op. cit. supra note 44, at 59-60.
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where to look for the evidence, and even this much information he had no
reliable way of obtaining.3
It is against this background of administration that we have to consider
the uses of a provision purporting to have automatic effect: what could it
add to the ability of the authorities to deal with offenders in general, and
with pluralists in particular?
In the first place, it might add significantly to the moral suasion of the rule
it sought to implement. It seems likely that this was the case with those
rules of clerical discipline to which the canons attached the sanction of
automatic irregularity for the exercise of the ministry. A priest who became
irregular through some momentary lapse added sin to sin as long as he
continued to minister, and also jeopardized his tenure of any preferment
that might come his way before he was absolved. 74 These were consequences
he might well have taken more seriously than he did the rule of conduct to
75
which they were attached.
73. If the cleric presented to a benefice were to appear in person to respond to an
inquiry of this kind, he would have to give some account of how he had been supported
in the past. Such an account might have given a chance of turning up any other
benefices he held, albeit not a foolproof chance, as he might have some other source of
income to show. Furthermore, a practice evidently grew up of allowing a cleric to be instituted into a benefice through his proctor, without showing up in person. This was
denounced at a 1460 Council in Canterbury. 35 MANSI 136. Another way in which
the "ordinary course of administration might have turned up a pluralist was through discovering on a routine visitation of one of his churches that he did not reside there. This
was not very satisfactory either, as there might be a number of reasons, legitimate or
illegitimate, besides pluralism, for not residing. As the nonresident would have on his
own person any documents relevant to his reasons for not residing, it would be necessary
to find him before passing on them - a task of considerable difficulty in the case of a
such
nonresident. Then, the nonresident when found might exhibit a valid reason as the royal service - for not residing on any of his benefices. This, of course, would tell
us nothing about how many benefices he held.
74. G. OesterlM, Irrigularitis,6 DDC 42, 54-5.
75. See for instance, the case of Richard Tittesbury, 5 CAL. PAPAL REG. 88-9 (1398).
Richard sought and received absolution from irregularities incurred on ten different
grounds, some dating back to his student days: (1) He told persons pursuing certain
robbers which way the robbers had gone, thereby assisting in bringing about their apprehension and consequent death. (2) While a student at Oxford, he went with drawn
sword to assist the chancellor in putting down a riot, in which affray a scholar was
killed. (3) Without consulting physicians, he gave certain food as medicine to a sick
friend, who thereafter died. (4) He received gifts from persons undergoing visitation, and
advised others to do so. (5) He made use of secular authority to impede appeals to Rome.
(6) He fought with other ecclesiastics, even to bloodshed, and even in consecrated places.
(7) He spoke certain words tending to reveal secrets of the confessional. (8) He took
orders and benefices despite the foregoing irregularities. (9) He received the diaconate
simoniacally, and the priesthood from a bishop simoniacally promoted. (10) He said
mass for five months in unconsecrated places and places under interdict. Tittesbury, according to A. B. EMDEN, 3 A BIOGRAPHICAL REGISTER OF THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD TO
A. D. 1500, at 1880 (Oxford, 1959), was ordained in 1395, so at the time of this
extraordinary baring of his soul he was a young priest with a foot already firmly planted
on the ladder of preferment. It may have been an increase of sobriety due to his
burgeoning responsibilities that moved him to rectify his situation in this way, or it may
have been fear for his career if he were to be found out at a later stage. In any event,
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On the other hand, where the automatic effect in question related not
to a man's personal status, but to his tenure of a benefice he ought not in
any event to have, it is difficult to see how the automatic effect could rise
any higher in moral suasion than the rule it sought to implement. Thus it
is that the moral reproaches leveled at pluralists in most of the canons on
the subject - they are avaricious, and they assume responsibilities they are
unable to discharge - took no additional force from the provision for automatic deprivation.
The one canon that seems to make automatic deprivation an independent
ground for persuading the pluralist to mend his ways is the 1279 enactment
of Archbishop Pecham. The automatic deprivation meant that, in addition
to drawing down revenues he ought not to have, the pluralist was purporting
to exercise a cure of souls that had not been delegated to him:
For those who knowingly invade these benefices in this way are putting
their sickles into other men's harvests; by the same token, since they do not
enter by the door they are not shepherds but thieves and robbers. Furthermore, they impudently cozen miserable souls, having no power to bind
76
them or to loose them.
This argument seems rather persuasive, but there is no indication that it
had any different effect from other forms of rhetoric in other canons. Pecham
reports in 1281 that his efforts did indeed lead a certain number of pluralists
to submit themselves.7 7 It does not appear, however, that there were enough
of them to make a real dent in the practice. Furthermore, in all probability
they were moved by the strictures against pluralism as such rather than by
the automatic deprivation, for Pecham says they gave up only their excess
benefices, whereas his legislation purported to deprive them of all.
Besides furnishing an additional source of moral suasion, a provision for
automatic effect might furnish an additional set of procedures. This was
expressly done in the language of the 1215 canon which refers to the earlier
provisions for the filling up of vacant benefices. Since the pluralist is automatically deprived of the earlier benefice, that benefice is automatically
vacant. Since it is vacant it may be filled up in the same way it would have

all ended happily for him. Although he was required to resign his preferment as a
condition for being absolved, he was immediately restored to it by papal provisions. 5 CAL.
PAPAL REo. 174. The provision recited that it was long vacancy that had given the pope the
power to provide to the benefice in question. The vacancy is presumably attributable to the
preexisting irregularity of the person instituted into the benefice most canonists considered such institution invalid. Oesterlk, loc. cit. supra note 74.
76. Can. 1, Reading 1279, 24 MANS! 257.
77. Can. 25, Lambeth 1281, 23 MANsi 419.
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been if the incumbent had died or resigned. Since, however, the machinery
set inmotion by the canon referred to was developed with a view to filling
78
it
benefices notoriously vacant and kept so through malice or neglect,
cannot have helped much in the case of the typical pluralist who held onto
his multiple benefices by escaping the attention of the authorities.
The provisions invoking the procedures for filling vacant benefices became
effective against pluralism, therefore, only when they began to elicit the
attention of a class of people more able or more willing than the ordinary administrative authorities to set the procedures in motion. This, the third and
most important of the benefits to be hoped for from a provision having automatic effect, came to pass when the automatic deprivation of pluralists began
to mesh with the proliferating machinery for bestowing benefices through
79

papal provision.
The exact workings of this system, which, by the midfourteenth century
had probably become the usual avenue of preferment for clerics, need not
concern us here. 8 0 Suffice it to say that after the papal decree Execrabilis
of 1317, which reserved to the Pope the right to fill any benefice made vacant
through the pluralism of the holder,8 1 it became possible for a cleric who
discovered a case of pluralism to file a petition in Rome reciting that suchand-such benefice had become vacant on account of pluralism, and requesting
that he himself be provided to it. Given the record-keeping techniques to
78. Can. 8, 3 Lateran 1179, 22 MANSi 222, c. 2, X, III, 8; 3 THOM. 528-9.
79. At first blush, it would seem that the automatic deprivation of the incumbent of a
benefice would be of interest to two other classes of people the patron who was
entitled to appoint someone else to the benefice, and the parishioners, who would be
entitled to withhold their tithes and other payments if the person claiming them were not
de jure the holder of the benefice. Neither of these groups materialized under the laws
against pluralism. Perhaps neither was in a very good position to learn about either the
fact of plurality or the law imposing deprivation. Furthermore, the patron, as the one
responsible for the man being in the benefice in the first place, might not be much interested in putting him out. As for the tithes, the law was that the bishop, through his
sequestrators, could collect them during the vacancy of the benefice. Vacation, in RICHARD
BURN,

2 ECCLESIASTICAL LAW 472 (London,

1763).

While a parishioner with litigious

inclinations might well put off the payment of tithes for some time by attacking the right
of the person seeking to collect them, he could probably foresee that the ecclesiastical
authorities would ultimately prevail.
80.

It

is set forth in

detail in

GEOFFREY BARRACLOUGIS,

PAPAL PROVISIONS

(Oxford,

1935).
81. C. un. Title III in Extravag. loan. XXII. After a sufficiently long vacancy, the
right to collate to a benefice devolved upon the Pope under the earlier legislation. C. 3,
X, I, 10. This rule presumably continued to apply except in cases covered by Execrabilis.
While in theory this devolution did not take place unless the ordinary had known of the
vacancy for the stipulated period (ibid.; G. Mollat, Bin-ifices Ecclisiastiques en Occident,
2 DDC 406, 414-5), it seems likely that the popes provided to such benefices on petitions
reciting that they had been vacant for the required period, without knowing whether
or not the ordinary had been aware of the vacancy. Richard Tittesbury's case, supra note
75, is evidently an example of this; so, perhaps, is the case at 10 CAL. PAPAL REG. 400-1
(1448).
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which I have already alluded, it was quite usual for the popes, as well as other
persons with large amounts of ecclesiastical patronage, to learn in this way
of the vacancy of benefices in their gift, and, if the informant had any claim
82
to their good will, to reward him by bestowing the benefice as requested.
Thus, a cleric with any reasonable ground to hope for a papal provision
might well expect to succeed to the benefice of any pluralist he brought to
light. It is through giving scope to importunities of this kind that Execrabilis
became - quite by accident, I suspect - the most effective, or the least
83
ineffective, of the measures taken against pluralism in the medieval church.
What this boils down to, of course, is administration through the use of paid
informers, a device that has never been in very good repute. We may question whether informers as a class can have made better parish priests than
pluralists.
The crucial point in this discussion of automatic effect is that no law
can achieve an administrative effect beyond the confines of its power to
elicit the relevant facts and bring them to the attention of the authorities.
When a law purports to apply automatically to a state of facts that has not
been authoritatively determined, the result is to introduce a debilitating
uncertainty into the structure of the law, without any corresponding advantage
in effective enforcement. This effect is well illustrated in the passage quoted
above from Pecham's 1279 canon, in which he accuses the pluralist of
cozening "miserable souls, having no power to bind them or to loose them."
If we are to take Pecham at his word, the laws against pluralism, developed
for the sake of a more effective use of the power of the keys, are in fact
leading multitudes of the faithful to seek the exercise of that power from men
who do not have it to exercise. Fortunately for the deceived parishioners,
Pecham is not altogether correct. There is a principle of "common error,"

82. Ann Deeley, Papal Provisions and Royal Rights of Patronage in the Early Fourteenth
Century, 43 ENGLISH HISTORICAL REVIEW 497 (1928). See 25 Edward III, St. 3, c. 3
(1350) for a statute directed at abuses due to the King's clerics seeking preferment from him
in the same way. It appears, incidentally, that persons seeking preferment through royal,
rather than papal, bounty also made use of Execrabilis to establish a vacancy of the
benefices they sought. The royal courts gave effect to Execrabilis as making the benefice
vacant, then refused to recognize the reservation to the Pope, that being contrary to royal
statutes against papal provisions. Thus the right to fill such benefices devolved upon the
King. Frederic Maitland, Execrabilis in the Court of Common Pleas, in ROMAN CANON
LAW IN ENGLAND ch. 5 (1898).
83. THOMPSON 12 n. says that the extravagant accumulation of multiple benefices was
effectively checked by Execrabilis. See also his longer work cited supra note 44. My own
guess is that by regularizing the distribution of plural benefices through a series of
legislative and administrative expedients of which Execrabilis was only a minor part, the
papacy succeeded in turning into channels of respectability the economic and bureaucratic
pressures that had led to the practice of pluralism.
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whereby in a case like this the canons can restore the power of binding and
84
loosing as secretly as they took it away.
Where, however, the uncertainty introduced into the law concerns this
world rather than the next, the consequences are not so easily escaped. Let
us consider, for example, Ottobuono's canon on the subject of bishops who
allow monasteries to appropriate the revenues of parish churches. The bishop
is forbidden to permit such an appropriation:
unless he to whom he confers it be so manifestly oppressed by poverty, or
unless there be some other lawful cause, so that the appropriation may be
rather esteemed agreeable to piety than contrary to law.8 5
Otherwise, the appropriation is to be automatically void. Obviously, no
religious superior able to do otherwise would allow the revenues of his house
to rest on so ephemeral a foundation as this. The result was a regular practice
of resorting to Rome for confirmation of appropriations made by local
86
ordinaries.
This is only one example of the uncertainty introduced into the law
through the use of dispositions having automatic effect - uncertainty which
often found no resolution except by wholesale papal confirmations of transactions tainted or possibly tainted with invalidity. There are a number of
confirmations in the papal registers even in cases where no definite ground
of invalidity appears. 8 7 The possible sources of invalidity that surrounded
so many legal transactions introduced into the entire system a climate of
nervousness which only an exercise of the plenitudo potestatis could allay.
Even the papacy, however, was not a sure refuge against the possible
impact of laws having automatic effect. Among the most important of such
laws were those dealing with papal rescripts. Much of the business of the
papacy - and by the close of the Middle Ages this had come to touch on
84. P. Jombart, Erreur Commune, 5 DDC 441. From Jombart's account it appears that
the principle that jurisdiction will be supplied in cases of common error is traditional in
the Roman law, and was recognized by the canonists from respectably early times, although
there is no reference to it in official canonical texts until the 1918 Code. In the Code,
it is embodied in can. 209, without any source note.
85. Can. 23, 23 MANSI 1237-8. The translation quoted in text is from 1 A COLLECTION
OF THE LAWS AND CANONS OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND 236 (John Johnson, ed., new
ed., London, 1850-1) except for the word "manifestly," which I have added.
86. For examples of papal confirmations of appropriations already approved by local
ordinaries, and where no ground of invalidity is apparent, see 1 CAL. PAPAL REG. 240
(1248); 5 id. 157 (1398); 5 id. 176 (1398). See also 3 id. 305 (1348) for a papal
faculty to a bishop to make appropriations.
87.

Besides

the appropriations

listed supra note

86,

see

validations

of

collations

to

benefices at 3 id. 282 (1348), 5 id. 165, 188 (1398); an election of a prior at 5 id. 151
(1398); an ordination of a vicarage at 5 id. 189 (1398); a foundation of chantry at 3 id.
300 (1348).
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the distribution of most of the ecclesiastical offices in Europe - was done
through these papal rescripts issued at the request of someone involved in
the transaction. In the usual case, the pope would have no knowledge of the
affair beyond what appeared in the petition. The rescript would therefore
be based on the allegations of the petition, and would contain a summary
of these allegations. The general teaching of the canonists was that if these
allegations had been deliberately falsified the rescript was invalid, and that
if false allegations had been made in good faith the rescript would be invalid
if the false allegations were those that actually moved the pope to grant the
rescript. 8 8 This rule meant, of course, that the canonical administration was
to be troubled by all manner of documents emanating from the highest source
in the system, entirely authentic, but not worth the paper they were written
on. Nor was there any way, aside from going into the facts of their original
89
issuance, to tell the valid from the invalid.
This persistent state of uncertainty is attributable, as I have already
suggested, to the law's propensity to outrun its capacity to elicit the relevant
facts on which effective administration depends. This propensity in turn
seems attributable to the academic and didactic tendencies in the system tendencies which, as we have seen, had the general effect of diverting the
canonical legislator from the functional problem of effectively marshalling
his administrative resources for the achievement of a desirable result. Thus
it appears to be of set purpose that the legislator attempted by the use of
automatic effect to project his activities beyond the reach of his administrative resources. This point is borne out by the language adopted by Gregory X
in dealing with underage clerics and clerics who fail to take orders:
Even though a canon laid down by our predecessor Alexander III of
88.

WILLIAM O'NEILL, PAPAL RESCRIPTS OF FAVOR

117-34 (Washington, 1930); R. Naz,

Rescrit, 7 DDC 607, 618-24. The doctrine set forth in text is greatly ramified by such
matters as the distinction between rescripts motu proprio and other rescripts, or that
between "subreption" or concealment of a material fact, and "obreption" or setting forth
as true something that is false.
89.
In some cases, the rescript would have to be presented to some local authority for
execution. He might or might not depending on the form of the rescript be required to investigate the truth of the allegations of the petition. O'NEILL, op. Cit. supra

note 88, at 167-76. Other rescripts required no executor. After the Council of Trent
most of these had to be submitted to the local ordinary for verification, but there was
evidently no such requirement in earlier times. Naz, supra note 88, at 627. It would
appear also that the principle of res judicata did not extend to an administrative investigation like that involved in the execution of a rescript, so that a favorable finding on
such an investigation would not prevent the subsequent invalidation of the rescript.
Naz, Chose Jugie, 3 DDC 695. For the extent of the uncertainty introduced into the
processes of the papacy by this kind of thing, see the Bishop of Dunkeld's case in 10 CAL.
PAPAL REG. 20 (1448), where a bishop in full possession of his see requires a firming
up of his title because the papal letters under which he was originally provided referred
to him as a Doctor of Canon Law, whereas he has only a licentiate.
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happy memory provided among other things that no one should undertake the governance of a parish unless he had attained the age of twentyfive years, and was of commendable learning and conversation, and that
if anyone, having undertaken such governance, were not, after warning,
ordained to the priesthood within the time prescribed by the canon, he
should be removed from it and replaced by another; since, however many
show themselves negligent in the observance of the canon we refer to, we
wishing to make up for their perilous negligence by the execution of the
law, provide by the present decree that no one shall be taken into the
governance of a parish unless he shall be suitable in morals, learning,
and age, and we order that any collation hereafter made to a parish
church of anyone who has not attained the age of twenty-five years shall
be entirely without effect. Furthermore, he who is taken into such
governance . . . shall have himself promoted to the priesthood within
a year's time. If he is not promoted within that time, he shall be deprived
of the church committed to him, without any previous warning, by
authority of the present constitution.9 0
In other words, the law itself is stepping into the gap created by the
negligence of its ministers. It does not appear with equal clarity that Innocent III regarded his 1215 canon on pluralism as improving on the 1179
canon in the same way, but, as we have seen, there is not much basis for
saying it improved on it in any other way. In general, the use of automatic
effect in the canons indicates that it is regarded as a device of especial
severity to be used when other devices have failed. The administrative problem is not wholly ignored, but no one seems to have taken it very seriously.
Here once more is the legate Ottobuono, speaking this time of clerics who
occupy posts in the secular bureaucracy:
Since indeed with men of ill will prohibitions do not prevent misdeeds
unless they are fortified with punishments, we order that whoever presumes to violate the foregoing shall be suspended ipso facto from his office
and benefice. Once suspended, should he be so rash as to inject himself
into them, he will not escape canonical punishment. 9 1
Why he will not escape canonical punishment is not made to appear. Perhaps we are not supposed to ask.
90. C. 14, I, 6, in V1*. (Emphasis added) The automatic deprivation provided in this
canon seems to have been caught up in the system of papal provisions in much the same
way as that provided in Execrabilis. See cases in 5 CAL. PAPAL REO. 103, 104 (1398).
Here, however, as the vacated benefice was not reserved to the Pope, the patron had a
space of time to fill the benefice. See id. 166 (1398) for a case of a priest who came by
his benefice in this way but received a papal collation to the same benefice because he
was unsure of his title.
91. Can. 7, London 1268, 23 MANSI 1223.
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E. As to sublime and literate persons, however, who ought to be honored
with greater benefices, a dispensation can be had from the Apostolic See
when reason demands.-The practice of dispensation, referred to in this
passage, seems to be one of the institutional forms imposed by the early
medieval canonists on the ancient pastoral practice of permitting in a particular case a deviation from a general rule. 9 2 This practice dates back to

the earliest times and seems responsive to a recognition that the subtle and
personal work of saving souls is not to be fully encompassed in the framework
of a set of general principles.9 3 Attempts have been made to reduce primitive
manifestations of the practice to juridical formulations, but they are not very
convincing. 9 4 The most that can be said with any confidence is that the
bishops felt free on occasion to authorize departures from the general principles
in which the pastoral experience of their colleagues and predecessors was
embodied, but that they did so with more confidence when fortified with the
opinions of their fellows, and later of the popes. 95
The canonists who first set themselves the task of imposing a Roman
law structure upon the administrative practices of the Church, found nothing
in the Roman system that quite corresponded to the practice in question.
While the Roman sources admitted of departing from the letter of the law
under certain circumstances, the circumstances were determined by general
equitable principles inherent in the legal system itself, and not by an ad hoc
exercise of authority. 96 In fact, the fourth century emperors expressly provided that their private rescripts should not be availing against the general
law. 97 Thus, the canonists were left to their own devices in developing a
terminology and a justification to integrate into their system the prevailing
practice in the Church.
To give the practice a name, they chose the term dispensatio, whose basic
meaning was household management or something of the kind, and which
in more recent times had been used to refer to what we would call administration. 98 The term corresponds to the Greek "economy," which has some
92. Naz, Dispense, 4 DDC 1283. The practice of dispensation applies only to those rules
which can be assigned a human, rather than a divine, origin. R. C. Mortimer, Historical
Introduction, in DISPENSATION

IN PRACTICE AND THEORY, BEING THE REPORT OF A COM-

MISSION APPOINTED BY THE ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY IN 1935,

at 8-10 (London, 1944).

[Hereafter cited as DISPENSATION REPORT]
93. DISPENSATION REPORT 1-4; Hamilcar S. Alivisatos, "Economy" from the Orthodox
Point of View, in DISPENSATION REPORT 27, 30-34.
94. DISPENSATION REPORT 1-8; Naz, Dispense, 4 DDC 1283, 1286-7.
95. DISPENSATION REPORT 4-8, 11-12.
96. Naz, supra note 94, at 1285; Charles Lefebvre, Natural Equity and Canonical Equity,
8 NATURAL LAW FORUM 122, 123-8 (1963).
97. THEODOSIAN CODE 1:2:2.
98. Naz, supra note 94, at 1283.
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patristic usage in this context, and is still used for the counterpart of dispensation in the Greek Church. 99
For justification, the canonists drew upon the ancient documents themselves, with their talk about necessity, utility, special circumstances and the
like, and on the doctrine of the plenitudo potestatis, which placed the Pope
above the canons, and therefore gave him an unlimited power to depart
from them. 10 0 The two lines of justification could not be fitted together
without a certain amount of effort, especially as a number of papal documents expressed the importance of guarding intact the salutary dispositions
of the Fathers. 10 1 Gratian's solution was to hold that the popes adhered to
the law not because they were bound by it, but in order to set a good example
to their subjects - following in this the example of Christ, who allowed
Himself to be circumcised, and otherwise complied with the Jewish Law,
although He was not bound by it.102
The important articulations of the theory of dispensation subsequent to
Gratian were concerned with the grounds on which dispensations might be
granted, and the nature of the dispensing authority (if any) of prelates
subordinate to the Pope. The first of these inquiries went not to the power
of the Pope - which, as we have seen, was considered unlimited - but to
the traditional and canonical framework within which that power was
exercised. Since by strict logic the power to dispense from the law must
be related to the power to make the law in the first place, and since the
prevailing doctrine would call for the exercise of that power for the common
good, there was some argument for requiring that dispensations be granted
only for the common good of the Church. 10 3 Our 1215 canon, by referring to the merits of the petitioner, seems to have clinched the argument
that the dispensing power could also be exercised for the private good of the
person dispensed. An exercise of this kind was attributed to benevolence,

99. Alivisatos, "Economy" from the Orthodox Point of View, in
27-43.
100. DISPENSATION REPORT 4-5, Naz, supra note 94, at 1286-7.

DISPENSATION

REPORT

101. C. 1-9, 16, C. XXV, q. 1. See especially c. 7, taken from a letter of Pope Zosimus
in 410: "Nor, indeed, can the authority of this see change what -is laid down by the
holy Fathers or concede anything against it. For with us there lives a firmly rooted
antiquity, which the decrees of the Fathers have guarded in due reverence [cui decreta
Patrum sanxere reverentiam]"; and c. 16, from Pope Leo IV in the midninth century:
"By the divine permission we are so far made shepherds of men that we ought by no
means to go outside what our Fathers have established, whether in the holy canons or
in worldly laws, and we do indeed act against their most salutary dispositions if we
do not conserve inviolate what they, by divine counsels, have laid down."
102. Dictum to C. XXV, q. 1.

103.

DISPENSATION REPORT

16-17; Naz, supra note 94, at 1290.
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mercy, kindheartedness or the like, and was regarded as a legitimate use
of the plenitudo potestatis.10 4
As to the power of subordinate prelates to dispense, the strict logic of
the position taken would allow them that power only with respect to laws
that they themselves had made. We have already seen, however, that they
felt free to deviate from papal or conciliar decrees if occasion demanded.
The canonists drew on equity, custom, implicit delegation, and whatever
other concepts they found at hand to bring their theory into accord with
10 5
the prevailing practice, but they were never altogether successful.
Against this background, we may suppose the quoted language from
the 1215 canon to be serving three purposes: that of justifying the granting
of dispensations from this canon in certain cases, that of denying to prelates
other than the Pope the power to dispense from this canon, and that of
setting standards of self-restraint in the exercise of that power by the Pope
himself. Underlying these uses of a legislative formula, we may discern a
certain dialectical tension between formal and personal elements in the
canonical system. This dialectical tension was manifested at the local level
by a certain informal tolerance of pluralism by local ordinaries in particular
cases, never extending to the grant of a formal dispensation, and evidently
10 6
never conferring complete security of tenure in one's plural benefices.
On the papal level, the same dialectical tension was found in the relation
between the benevolent exercise of the plenitudo potestatis and the limitations
imposed by canonical practice on the common forms of papal dispensations.
These limitations were continually being themselves dispensed from, the dispensation from them being reduced to another common form, the common
104. Naz, supra note 94, at 1290-1. Thomassin disagrees, holding that extra compensation for noble or learned clerics was for the common good of the Church. 5 THOM. 108.
105. DISPENSATION REPORT 11-12, 17-18; Naz, supra note 94, at 1278; Thomassin suggests that as long as all was done in charity and for the good of the Church there was
no debate between bishops and popes over who might dispense. 5 THOM. 105-6. To
say that there was no debate among bishops and popes is not, of course, to say that there
was no debate among canonists.
106. In addition to the temporizing, already referred to, on the part of Archbishop
Pecham, see W.

W. Capes, Introduction, REGISTRUM

THOME DE CANTILUPO

(1275-82)

xxxv-xxxvii (Canterbury and York Society, v. 2, R. G. Griffiths & W. W. Capes, ed.,
1907). See also PANTIN 39-40. Pantin is addressing himself to the practice of pluralism
as such, rather than to the existence or nonexistence of the requisite papal dispensations, but the quotations he uses seem to bespeak men who are used to the holding
of pluralities without papal dispensation. Note also that Thomassin attributes the proliferation of exceptions in the application of the rule against pluralism particularly in the
area of sinecures - to the difficulty of enforcing the law. 4 THOM. 621. It would seem
also that the constitution Ordinarii Locorum of the Council of Lyons (1274), c. 3, I, 16,
in VI*, was responsive to a certain tolerance of pluralists on the part of local bishops. See
W.

T.

Waugh,

625 (1913).
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form subjected to new limits, and the process repeated again. 10 7
In sum, despite the efforts of the canonists to impose their forms and
categories on dispensation and kindred practices, these practices can be best
understood not through those forms and categories, but through two principles
we have observed in connection with other parts of the canon we are considering. These principles are that the typical canon embodies a moral
judgment upon the practice it forbids, and that its enforcement involves
an exercise of personal leadership. Under particular circumstances, the one
whose personal leadership is required for the execution of the canon may
determine in the exercise of his pastoral discretion that there exists a moral
and spiritual context in which it is better not to follow what the canon requires. The possibilities for abuse in so broad a discretion as this are obvious,
and the canonists attempted to hedge the discretion around in such a way
as to limit the possibilities for abuse without limiting the discretion itself.
From the dilemma thus created arose the law concerning dispensations.
We began this discussion of obligation with a brief summary of the three
approaches to the definition of law that have commended themselves to
students of secular jurisprudence - one in terms of moral suasion, one in
terms of prediction of physical coercion, and one in terms of pure internal
analysis. We saw that all of these had a certain support in the realities of
a secular legal system. We should now be able to note by way of contrast
that none of them has much support in the realities of the medieval canon
law.

1) The moral suasion of the canons lay, as we have seen, not so much
in the canons themselves as in the moral principles that led to their enactment.
Any just law has a certain basis in morality, but in the secular systems the
legal disposition has a moral life of its own, making a bid for the conscience
of the subject even in a case not covered by the underlying moral principle.
In other words, obedience to the law is regarded as a virtue in its own right, dis-

107. See Charles Lefebvre, Privilige, 7 DDC, 225, 228. See c. 1, 2, I, 11, in VI* for
examples of limitations on the effect of common forms; see 5 CAL. PAPAL REG. 87-8
(1398) for an example of a dispensation from such limitations. The indult, I CAL.
PAPAL REG. 246 (1248), to the Bishop of Bath and Wells to be free from papal provisions
even if they contain a non obstante clause seems to bespeak a comparable sequence at
an earlier date. At pages 244 and 249 of the same volume of papal registers are examples
of provisions notwithstanding indults of exemption; it is presumably against these that the
Bishop of Bath and Wells is protected. In some cases a papal privilege is armed with
a clause to the effect that no subsequent rescript shall be effective against it unless the
privilege is expressly mentioned in the subsequent rescript, e.g., id. at 246 (1248). It is,
however, quite possible for a rescript to contain a clause making it effective against all
contrary privileges, even those entitled to special mention.
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tinct from whatever virtue may lie in the particular conduct enjoined by the
law in question. The canons, because of their moralizing preambles, because of
the didactic tendencies that affected their content, and, above all, because of the
system of dispensations and other elements of pastoral selectivity that limited
their enforcement, never quite achieved this independent moral life. Just as it
was always considered necessary to appeal to the underlying moral principle
to justify the framing or enforcing of a canon, so it was always possible
to appeal to the same moral principle to justify not obeying the canon after it
was made. Thus, as late as 1366, after all the legislation that had been
enacted on the subject of pluralism, a pluralist still found it possible to
defend himself by invoking moral principles extrinsic to the law:
And it is laid down in the sacred canons that a good and industrious and
literate person can govern two or even ten churches better than another
can govern one; and both he who resides and he who does not reside are
understood to serve the altar, so long as they live a good life and expend
well the income they derive.' 0 8
2) In predicting when some form of physical coercion will be applied,
the canons seem to have been a good deal less serviceable than we expect
secular enactments to be. We have seen that a renewed exercise of personal
leadership was considered necessary to the enforcement of a rule however firmly
it was embodied in older canons. Every medieval bishop who showed any
zeal for the administration of his diocese seems to have had the same old
problems to contend with, and to have addressed himself to them, sometimes
via the enactment of new canons, sometimes via the enforcement of old ones,
with an 6lan that depended far more on his personality than on the content
of the canons. Thus, by consulting the canons, one could predict how his
bishop would try to get him to behave, but not what, if anything, would
be done to him if he did not behave that way.
3) The same idea of renewal that makes it so difficult to predict the
coercive application of the canons makes it all but hopeless to approach them
from a standpoint of internal analysis.10 9 For instance, pluralism was made
unlawful for the Universal Church in 1179, yet it was forbidden again in

108. PANTIN 40. The broad reference to the sacred canons in this case seems to reinforce the conception advanced in text that they are basically conceived of as formulations
of moral principles. PANTIN 39 quotes one other passage in defense of the pluralist, this
one rather more than a century earlier, which makes still clearer the extralegal character
of the arguments advanced. See infra note 114.
109. I say this despite the fact that internal analysis in the modern sense seems to have
been an important part of the work of the late medieval canonists. See the discussion
in Waugh, supra note 106, of Lyndwood's treatment of the canon Ordinarii Locorum.
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1215, and treated as having been lawful before. The pluralist was deprived
ipso jure of his excess benefices by the 1215 canon, yet in 1247 he was
being compelled to resign them.1 10 Prelates coming home from a general
council would enact some of its canons locally, and let others go by the
board."' In short, there was much important legislation that did not affect
the internal analytical content of the law, while much of what any analysis
would include in the law was in fact not treated as such. The dynamics of
the system are far more remote than are those of any secular system from
what can be encompassed within a series of analytical statements that suchand-such is the law.
If, then, the various definitions elicited from the systems of secular jurisprudence will not avail to define the nature of the obligation imposed by
the canons, is there a key element in the canons themselves that will open
to us the mystery of their obligation? The question bears more investigation,
but I would tentatively suggest that this key element is to be found in the
teaching office of the Church. It is this that unites these two elements of
didacticism and personal leadership that have appeared as the common
threads in the detailed analysis we have just completed. The canons present
themselves to the individual Christian as the corporate witness of the Church
to the guiding principles governing her interior life, and to the shepherds of
the Christian people as the collected experience of the Fathers in bringing
those principles home to their flocks.
The obligation imposed by the canons, then, is less juridical than
pedagogical: it is the obligation of a wise man to allow himself to be governed
by the counsels and experience of those wiser and more experienced than himself. The peculiarities we discern in the enforcement of the canons are explained by noticing that the obligation is to be guided - neither to follow
unthinkingly nor to innovate rashly. "Therefore every scribe instructed in
the kingdom of God is like to a householder who brings forth from his
treasure new things and old."
The canons as thus conceived have no small appeal as an instrument
for ordering the interior life of the Church, the corporate existence of the
people of God. Yet, for that very reason the canonical system displayed serious
defects in meeting the temporal administrative burdens of the medieval
church. For even the monumental achievement of the canonists in giving
110. See note 71 supra.

11.

MARION

GIBBS & JANE LANG,

BISHOPS AND REFORM,

1215-72 (1934), is devoted,

especially in the latter part, to an examination of the manner in which the decrees of
the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 were disseminated in England. Of particular interest is
the concluding discussion, which deals with attitudes moving the decision of the local
bishops as to which of the canons of the general council were the most important.
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their system a juridical structure could not impose on it that orientation toward
external order that is required of a legal system if it is to deal successfully with
temporal affairs.

IV.
THE

MOST

THE PROBLEM OF SANCTION

part of the structure of canonical sanctions is

FUNDAMENTAL

bound up with the same magisterial and pastoral elements we have discerned
in the rest of the canon law. Here, the sanction most usual and the most typical -

excommunication is the

constitutes an institutionalized and

personalized denunciation of a moral failing, calculated to induce in the
Christian community a dread of the divine wrath of which this is a foretaste,
and in the offender himself a change of heart, signified by the acceptance
of a salutary penance imposed by the pastoral authority. The penance, in
turn, was calculated to consummate the repentance of the sinner with an
outward sign, both for the edification of the community and for the spiritual
well-being of the sinner.
Against the background of this fundamental conception of canonical
sanction, let us consider that quintessentially hard-shelled character introduced
into legal analysis by Justice Holmes -

the bad man:

You can see very plainly that a bad man has as much reason as a good
one for wishing to avoid an encounter with the public force, and therefore
you can see the practical importance of the distinction between morality
and law. A man who cares nothing for an ethical rule which is believed
and practiced by his neighbors is likely nevertheless to care a great deal
to avoid being made to pay money, and will want to keep out of jail
11 2
if he can.
We have, to be sure, already rejected Holmes' attempt to make of this
bad man and his affairs a defining criterion of the legal system as far as the
canon law is concerned.

There remains for him, however, an important

subordinate role in the analysis of the system. He appears in the ambit of the
medieval church in at least such force that ability to cope with him can be
one gauge of the administrative effectiveness of the system.
With the bad man, suae salutis immemor, envisaged by Holmes, we will
have to include also a rather more frequently occurring type, the good man
who is not persuaded in conscience that the behavior denounced by a given
canon is actually wrong. We have seen that the didactic tendency of the
canons encouraged the belief that violating a canon was morally all of a
112.
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piece with violating the purported moral principle on which the canon was
based, so that the canon would have little moral suasion for one not convinced of the underlying moral principle. By the same token, one who was
not convinced of the sinfulness of violating the canon would tend not to
think himself affected by the spiritual censures directed against the violator
of the canon. Such a one, therefore, as regards the efficacy of the canonical
13
sanction, would be in the same case as the bad man.'
From the standpoint, then, of the bad man or the convinced nonconformist, let us consider the main sanctions which the canonical system brought
to bear on the violator.
A. Excommunication.-Insofar as excommunication was automatic, it
may have had some effect in cutting off the culprit from the society of those
who knew he had incurred it, but we may doubt if this had more than
minimal effect except on those who were disposed to be his enemies in the
first place. Where the excommunication was officially pronounced and
applied to a specific person, this effect may have been more pronounced.
Here too, however, the culprit would be apt to have partisans of the same
mind with himself, who would receive him and insure that the deprivation
4
of the society of faithful Christians did not sit too heavily on him."1
The most important effect of excommunication from the standpoint we
are considering was provided by the civil processes that could be invoked in
support of it. In England, upon proper notice to the secular authorities, a
writ de excommunicato capiendo would issue, under which the excommunicate would be seized by the sheriff and kept in confinement until absolved,
113. Gerard Moran, General Administrative Law, 9 RUTGERS LAw REVIEW 40 (1954),
develops a conceptual figure he christens Hardhead, who embodies rather well the kind
of person I have in mind:
At times Hardhead will seem to be an alias for Holmes' bad man; but generally
it will be best to conceive of him as either unusually self-centered or as a man of
high principle. The verbal commands of law either do not apply to him or are
"unconstitutional" in the sense of wrong.
With the picture of the doggedly pre-Roosevelt businessman evoked by this description,
compare the "young men, ferocious and strenuous" referred to by Bishop Walter Cantilupe
in the passage quoted in PANTIN 39, men who "would face the greatest dangers, sooner
than let themselves be deprived of their benefices and reduced to a single benefice."
114. See THOMPSON 234-5 for the 1446 case of William Wrauby, vicar of the church
of Brampton, who was denounced in the records of the Bishop's court as having incurred
automatic excommunication for knowingly harboring and admitting to divine services a
priest who had just been deprived and excommunicated in the same court for his manifold contumacies. It appears that a man who regarded himself as innocent in the matter
on which his excommunication was founded would be apt to regard himself as not bound
by the excommunication. Rosalind Hill, Theory and Practice of Excommunication in
Medieval England, 42 His-oaY (N.S.) 1, 5-6 (1957). See THOMPSON 237 for a case of
a priest who continued to say mass, although excommunicated and denounced as such.
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or until he gave bond to abide the judgment of the Church- that is, to appear before the ecclesiastical court, and do whatever was required of him
5
in order to be absolved."1
This made of excommunication a reasonably effective form of mesne
process, but did not give it any value as a sanction on the substantive law,
since anyone who sought absolution and was prepared to abide by the
judgment of the court must needs be absolved. Furthermore, its effectiveness
even as mesne process depended on the intervention of the secular authorities,
l 6
which the bishops seem often to have been reluctant to invoke."
B. Irregularity.-The sanction of irregularity was attached as an automatic effect to a number of forms of clerical misbehavior, chiefly those involving bloodshed. It entailed for those not yet in orders a disability to be
ordained, and for those already ordained a disability to carry out the sacramental function attached to their order. As most of the benefices of the
church required the possession and exercise of orders, a person who became
irregular stood in danger of losing his benefices if he were found out. This
danger must have had some effect in leading offenders to make themselves
known and seek absolution, rather than face continuing insecurity in the tenure
7
of their positions."1
While irregularity of its own nature was a permanent condition of the
person affected by it, it was so freely dispensed from that it cannot have had
more than a limited effect as a temporal sanction upon the conduct to which
it was attached."i 8 Rather, its role must have been that of another form of
mesne process, leading certain types of offenders to present themselves for
the imposition of other kinds of sanctions." 9
115.

POLLOCK &

MAITLAND,

I THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF

EDWARD I, at 478 (2nd ed., Cambridge, 1898). The release of such persons on bond was
regarded as an abuse, and the prelates included it from time to time among their lists
of grievances, e.g., REGISTRUM JOHANNIS DR PONTISSARA (1282-1304) 771 ff. (Canterbury
and York Society, v. 19, 30, C. Deedes, ed., 1915-24). The prelates also protested the failure
of the kings to supervise adequately the sheriffs to whom these writs de excommunicato
capiendo were addressed. Art. 11, London 1257, 23 MANSI 956. Pecham in 1279 attempted
to formulate a general excommunication of sheriffs who neglected to seize excommunicates,
or who let them go before they were absolved, but he was forced to withdraw this on the
king's insistence that the punishment of his officials must be left to him. FREDERICK POWICKE,
THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY 1216-1307, at 476 (Oxford, 1953).

116. Rosalind Hill, Public Penance: Some Problems of a Thirteenth-Century Bishop,
36 HISTORY (N.S.) 213, 216 (1951).
117. See notes 74 and 75, and accompanying text, supra.
118.

CHRISTOPHER ST. GERMAIN, THE ADDICIONS OF SALEM AND BYZANCE fol. 5 (Lon-

don, 1534), suggests a further source of ineffectiveness in that the grounds of automatic
irregularity are so numerous that no priest can hope to avoid them all. This seems an
exaggeration.

119. It should be noted also that the forms of misbehavior to which irregularity was
attached were not ones that a reasonably sober-minded cleric in middle life would find
it particularly difficult to renounce. See note 75 supra.
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C. Monition.-A monition is a kind of official warning. It may emerge
from various judicial or pastoral situations, including an official inquiry into
the conduct of a cleric:
Sir John Marshall, rector of Hamerton, is reported for having absented
himself from that church for a long time without cause. On the fourth
day of November, 1446, . . . he appeared, and admits that he has
absented himself: he alleges fear, however. Therefore he is assigned the
following day . . . in the same place to prove in legal form that which
he has alleged. On which day . . . he appeared and was deficient in his
proof; therefore he is warned that he reside henceforward and minister
120
in person in his church.
The chief effect of the monition is to pave the way for more severe penalties
if the offending conduct is continued or resumed. Thus, it is what might
be called a "one-bite" sanction.' 2 1 It can readily be seen, for instance, that
if this is the usual way of proceeding against nonresident rectors, a rector
may with impunity absent himself until such time as he is caught and pro122
ceeded against canonically.
In fact, this one-bite approach seems to have been all but universal in
dealing with a number of classes of offense, 123 including, in the case of the
12 5
and even concubinage.' 26
clergy, nonresidence, 12 4 forbidden employments,
Indeed, as we have seen, it was generally considered preferable to give some
advance warning before moving even against those offenders whose punishments were supposed to have automatic effect. The object of this use of
the monition was evidently to give the offender a chance to reform. Thus
understood, it relates to the didactic orientation we have already discerned
animating the substantive provisions of the canons.
D. Penance.-For those sins brought to light in the external forum that is, outside the confessional - a symbolic expiation in the form of a
120. THOMPSON 235-6.
121. See WILLIAM PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 325 (2nd ed., St. Paul, 1955) for
the principle of legal liability that gives rise to the oversimplified statement that "every
dog is entitled to one bite."
122. THOMPSON 237 has a case of a man who has been absent five years.
123. Generally, there was supposed to be a monition before a person was excommunicated. Can. 47, 4 Lateran 1215, C. 48 X, V. 39.
So also in many cases there was supposed to be a monition before he was deprived of a
benefice. G. Mollat, Bdrnfices Ecclisiastiques en Occident, 2 DDC 406, 433.
124. In addition to the case quoted above, see 3 REG. CHICHELE, supra note 12, at 381.
There is, however, a case in THOMPSON 231 of a man put to penance for not residing.
In this case, the accompanying monition threatened excommunication, rather than deprivation, if the monition were not obeyed.
125. C. 16, X, III, 1.
126. C. 3, 4, X, III, 2.
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public penance was exacted. The sinner who neglected or refused to accept and perform such a public penance was excommunicated for his contumacy, with the consequences already discussed. Penances of this kind were
27
regularly imposed on those guilty of violence, sexual offenses, and the like.'
We have seen a canon of Pecham's which appears to threaten pluralists
with the imposition of penances, but in general this sanction seems not to
have been used in cases involving the tenure of benefices and the discharge
of the duties attached to them. This is perhaps because some action involving the benefice itself was thought to serve better in such cases. While
the canons say nothing expressly on the subject, it appears not to have been
considered appropriate to visit a single offense with two kinds of punishment,
128
such as penance and deprivation.
The character of the penance imposed when that sanction was resorted
to has been perceptively analyzed by Rosalind Hill, with examples taken from
12 9
the register of Oliver Sutton, a late twelfth century bishop of Lincoln.
The midfifteenth century material appended by Hamilton Thompson to his
The English Clergy seems to bear out Miss Hill's analysis. 130 Miss Hill
points out that each penance was tailor-made to the individual case, and sets
forth the governing principles as follows:
In devising a penance the ecclesiastical authority had to bear in mind
three points. The penance must be salutary, that is to say that it must be
designed to bring the individual to a proper state of grace and to keep
him there. It must be deterrent, or sufficiently painful to mind and body
to ensure that other people were prevented from committing similar
offenses. Finally, in the widest sense of the word, it must be decent, and
conducive to public order. It must not expose a person holding a
responsible position to such humiliation that it would henceforward be
31
impossible for him to exercise his authority.'
The goal of salutariness seems well implemented in the examples. The ex127.

E.g.,

THOMPSON

206-19

(violence),

221

(sorcery);

REGISTRUM

JOHANNIS

DR

TRILLEK (1344-60) 98 (Canterbury and York Society v. 8, J. H. Parry, ed., 1911-12)
(adultery). See also the cases referred to in Hill, supra note 116, at 217-19.
128. C. 12, 13, D. 81, both taken from the Apostolic Canons, seem to be inconsistent
on this point. 12 says that a priest or deacon who commits certain offenses is to be
deposed, but not deprived of communion, since he should not be judged twice for the
same offense: "Non judicat Deus bis in idipsum." 13 says that a bishop, priest, or deacon
guilty of fornication or adultery is to be deposed, and expelled from the church to do
penance among the laity. The same ambiguity presents itself in the medieval period, in
that the practice proposed by Henry II for dealing with clerical felons, and rejected by
Becket under the rubric "non bis in idipsum" became the regular practice in cases of
heresy. R. Laprat, Bras Siculier (Livraison au), 2 DDC 981.
129. Supra note 116.
130.

THOMPSON 206-46.

131.

Supra note 116, at 216. The examples that follow are all taken from id. at 217-24.
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pressions of contrition and the forms of reparation required are ingenious and
often moving. One who causes "a great effusion of blood" in the church
is required to provide branches and candles for decorations, and rushes to
cover the floor. Two clerics who quarrel on consecrated ground are to
stand at opposite sides of the chancel steps and chant the psalter to one
another.
This goal of salutariness was also ingeniously interwoven with that of
decency and good order. Thus, where a group of men fortify and defend
a church, they are made to come in procession into the church in question
and offer their weapons and armor at the altar. This is salutary. But one
among them is a knight, and he may bring his squire with him to carry his
weapons and armor for him. This is decent, and insures proper respect
for the order of knighthood. "The same desire for public decorum," says
Miss Hill,
causes Sutton to take great care to ensure that the penances which he
imposed upon members of the clergy were not such as to impair their
authority in the eyes of lay persons. Clerks, even those who were young,
were rarely beaten in public and then only by a cleric of senior standing. As a rule, when they received a beating, only members of the clergy
132
were allowed to be present.
This brings us to the subject of deterrence, the second of the goals Miss
Hill enumerates, and the one of most interest to us from the bad-man standpoint we are considering. In Miss Hill's examples, the deterrent effect was
achieved partly by corporal punishment, usually beating, and partly by some
form of humiliation, such as appearing barefooted or otherwise incompletely
clothed. In the case of the clergy and highly placed laymen, the humiliation
was necessarily mitigated by the goal of decorum, as we have already seen.
Beatings and ancillary humiliations, then, done in a form suited to the
offender's station in life, constituted the staple of deterrent sanctions in the
imposition of penance. We may question whether in the more serious cases
they were sufficient to deter:
A clerk who had joined in a particularly brutal and sacrilegious attack
upon the clergy and parish church of Thame was commanded to beg the
pardon of every individual whom he had wronged and forbidden to
enter his parish church for five months. Every Sunday during this period
he was to come as far as the church door, where he was to remain
33
intoning litanies and penitential psalms while the mass was going on.'
132.
133.
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We may wonder whether anyone who was inclined to make a "particularly brutal and sacrilegious attack" on another would be very much deterred by the prospect of having to perform such a penance as this if caught.
We may wonder equally whether the example of John of Heyford, beaten
three times in the market place for debauching a nun, would have done
much to deter a man minded to the same offense. That deterrents of this
kind did not sufficiently deter is borne out by the witness of the clergy themselves in the case of violence to their persons. Their pleas for royal protection against such violence reach the point of desperation by the fifteenth
1 34
century.
The penances actually imposed, then, seem to have been insufficient to
deter, or at least insufficient to deter the bad man we are considering. The
question that naturally arises, then, is why they were not made more severe.
The answer would seem to be that, given the ethos of the system, they could
not have been. We have already remarked that the actual practice met
the goal of salutariness rather well. Many a sinner, walking barefoot into
church with a candle in his hand, must have been led to reflect on the offense
he had done to God and neighbor and to resolve to mend his ways, whereas
the cruder punishments meted out by the secular authorities would only
have hardened him. Thus, the system of penance in many cases served the
purpose for which it was designed, and could not have been radically altered
13 5
without being false to that most important purpose.
When we turn from the types of offense for which penances were customarily imposed to the myriad administrative violations that sapped the
organizational efficiency of the church in so many ways, we come to a still
more serious obstacle to the expansion of the system of penance to afford
a deterrent. As long as the system is articulated in terms of sin, the severity
of the penance must be proportionate to the moral guilt involved, rather
than to the need for deterring the offense as determined by its effect on the
work and witness of the church. Pluralism, nonresidence, ordination outside
the diocese - these were vices which the church was under an urgent necessity of deterring, but morally they were not to be compared with shedding
blood in church or with debauching nuns, and it would have been scandalous
to visit them with a comparable penance. Generally, then, as a sanction
addressed to the effective administration of the canon law, the system of
penance must be considered at best peripheral.
134.
135.

3 REo. CHICHELE, supra note 12, at 76-8.
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E. Imprisonment.-The ordinary use of a prison in the canonical system, as in the secular systems of the time, was for the custody of an accused
person pending the final disposition of his case. A decretal of Boniface VIII,
however, allowed an ordinary, if he found it expedient in a particular case,
to send one of his own clergy to prison to do penance. 1 36 Earlier, Gratian
had collected a few documents allowing the assignment of a "'locus penitentiae"; these texts, however, seem to envisage a monastery rather than a
7
prison.13
Whether physical confinement was in a monastery or in a prison, it seems
clear from the canonical texts that such confinement was conceived as a form
of penance, rather than as a distinct kind of punishment. We may suppose
that its imposition was affected by the considerations already discussed which
limited the severity of penances. In any event, the only persons generally
imprisoned under canonical processes in England were clerics who had been
previously convicted of felony by the secular courts. The use of this sanction
in cases of this kind seems to be the result of a complicated church-state
dialectic, rather than of an independent determination by the ecclesiastical
authorities of the appropriate sanction in such cases.' 3 8 The prelates were
under continual pressure from the secular authorities to make the imprisonment of felonious clerics more certain and more burdensome than they
39
customarily did.'
F. Money Payments.-There were three ways in which the canonical
system provided for the exaction of money. One was as a civil remedy, corresponding to contract or tort damages in our own secular system, one was
as a punishment, corresponding to a fine in our system, and one was as an
administrative device.
The first, the civil remedy, was available wherever the jurisdiction of
the Church extended by reason of the sin of one mart against another. Thus,
one who had pledged his faith to the payment of a sum of money could be
admonished to pay it on pain of excommunication, 140 and one who had
wronged another could be compelled in connection with the process of

136. C. 3, V, 9, in VI * .
137. C. 7-11, D. 81. See also c. 6, X, V, 37. It would seem also that the locus penitentiae, being connected with the discipline of penance, would have to be voluntarily submitted to. Refusal so to submit, however, would be ground for excommunication, whereby the offender could be imprisoned until absolved.
138. LEONA GAREL, BENEFIT OF CLERGY IN ENGLAND IN THE LATER MIDDLE AGES
92-115 (Northampton, 1928) ; 1 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, Op. cit. supra note 115, at 439-57.
139. See Archbishop Islip's constitution on this, 26 MANSi 295 (1351).
140.
1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, Op. cit. supra note 115, at 128-9; 2 id. 197-8.
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penance and absolution to make due restitution in money or in kind.14 1
In England the secular authorities regarded the availability of these
remedies in the church courts as a trespass upon the secular jurisdiction, and issued writs of prohibition against proceedings in which
such remedies were sought. 14 2 Nevertheless, these remedies must have been
more or less effective, as they continued to be sought and granted throughout the Middle Ages, albeit in cases pretty much peripheral to the main
14 3
administrative necessities of the church.
The second form of financial exaction, that which corresponds to the
secular fine, was used frequently enough as a form of penance, but it seems
to have had less bite to it than the personal or bodily penances did. The
requirement of public decorum in the imposition of penances, as outlined
by Miss Hill, may well furnish the explanation for this weakness. Financial
returns in medieval society were attached to functions of public importance.
A man who had money used it to maintain the prestige necessary to do his
job, and the assistants he required in doing it efficiently. Thus, a large sum
of money taken from him would be felt in his public function rather than
in his private comfort.
Conversely, if, as was often the case, the financial exaction took the form
of a requirement that the sinner establish some concrete memorial of his
penitence - an endowed mass, a chapel or something of the kind - the
prestige gained from the good work might well be so advantageous to the
sinner as to outweigh the financial cost. Under such circumstances, the financial expenditure might be edifying as a tangible pledge of contrition and reform, but it would not be so burdensome as to afford a deterrent from
the sin in question.
Even in the realm of edification, however, the money payment proved
infelicitous. Since it was, or appeared to be, less burdensome to the penitent
than personal or bodily penances would have been, 14 4 it gave almost inevitably the impression of being a kind of bribe by which the rich could
avoid the penances visited upon the poor. 14 5 This impression was heightened
by a fairly common abuse whereby the pious contribution enjoined as a
penance would redound to the material benefit of the authority imposing

141.
142.

Hill, supra note 116, at 217.
POLLOCK & MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 115, at 199-203.

143.

BRIAN WOODCOCK,

MEDIEVAL ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS IN THE DIOCESE OF CAN-

TERBURY 87-92, 107-108 (Oxford, 1952).
144. Note the request of the clergy to the bishops that corporal penances be imposed
presumably instead of pecuniary in cases of notorious and repeated adultery. Art.

8, London 1399, 26 MANSI 924.
145. See Ottobuono's language in can. 20, London 1268, 23 MANSI 1235-6.
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the penance. 14 6 Under the circumstances, the imposition of money penances
147
fell rather early into a disrepute from which it has never recovered.
The third use of money payments - as an administrative device - involved an exercise of control over the money itself or the source of it, rather
than over the person of the one possessed of it. Under the name of sequestration, such an exercise of control was regularly resorted to in order to preserve the subject matter of a suit pendente lite.148 As a device for the achievement of substantive administrative results, it has just enough recognition in
the canons to raise a tantalizing question as to why it was not put into general use. It appears in the Decretals in the form of a letter from Gregory
IX to the Patriarch of Antioch, ordering him to recall his clergy to residence,
and if they do not return, to use the fruits of their benefices to provide for
the service of their cures as long as they remain absent. 14 9 This would seem
a rather practical approach to the problem of nonresidence, as it spared the
bishop the necessity of finding the elusive incumbent before proceeding against
him. In fact, however, it seems to have assumed an ancillary role in a proceeding fundamentally directed at the personal correction of the nonresi0

dent. 15
Another example of controlling revenues for administrative purposes is
presented by one of Ottobuono's English canons of 1268, on the subject of
dilapidations. It provides that if an incumbent after a monition is issued fails
for two months to make necessary repairs to a building for which he is responsible the bishop may himself have the repairs made, and pay for them

146. This practice is denounced by Alexander III in C. 3, X, V, 37, and in an English synod of 1295. RFo. PONTISSARA, supra note 115, at 207-39.
147. The prevalence of money commutation was a constant ground of Puritan denunciation of the entire medieval penitential apparatus, as carried over into post-Reformation
Anglicanism. See, e.g. (Anon.), The Proctor and Parator their Mourning, Bodleian Pamph.,
D40 (34) (1641): "Countrey wenches would sell their petticoats rather to pay us then
to endure a white sheet [the customary garment worn in the performance of public
penances]; how have wee thriven by their wantonnesse?"
148. Naz, Siquestre, 7 DDC 973.
149. C. 16, X, III, 4.
150. C. 28, X, II, 28 seems to treat this as a means of providing for the cure pendente
lite; so does Can. 2168 of the 1918 Code. Title IV of Book III of the Decretals, dealing with
nonresidence, has only one canon, c. 11, which expressly addresses itself to the eventuality
that the incumbent cannot be found. It provides not for sequestration, but for deprivation six months after a citation is made public for the third time. Cf. REo. TPILLEK, supra

note 127, at 46-8. This is to be followed by personal sanctions and excommunication if
the ousted cleric does not return to the obedience of his ordinary. Canon 2381 of the
1918 Code provides for depriving a nonresident of the fruits of his benefice, but so far
from using the benefice as a means of reaching the incumbent, it uses the incumbent as
a means of reaching the benefice - calling upon him to forward his receipts to the
ordinary. Thus, neither medieval nor modem Catholic canon law arrived at the use of
sequestration to coerce the nonresident in the manner of the nineteenth century Anglican
practice initiated with 43 George III, c. 84 (1803).
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out of the fruits of the benefice.' 5 ' This provision has no counterpart in
the general canon law; the only provision in the Decretals envisages personal
correction of the incumbent who fails to make repairs, 1' 5 2 and the canons
153
collected by Gratian say nothing about procedure.
One other use of a comparable device in England is found in the procedure by which a bishop might sequester a benefice to pay the debts of the
incumbent. This, however, was in response to a royal writ, 15 4 and there is no
indication the canons authorized it.156
Sanctions of this kind, involving the exercise of control over the physical
facilities of a diocese, rather than over the persons of the clergy, could have
given the ecclesiastical authorities a great deal of increased administrative
flexibility, and made up for many of the gaps in the system of personal
correction. It is difficult to fathom, therefore, why such sanctions were not
given anything like the scope of which they were capable. There is no real
answer to such a question as this, but it is possible to guess. My own guess
is that administrative techniques that operated on things rather than persons
presented an alien appearance in the canonical structure because the canonical
structure was founded on personal moral leadership.' 5 6 We, in our own
time, distinguish so readily between the pastoral and the administrative
functions of a prelate that it is hard for us to empathize an attitude that
would regard them as one. Yet there is much in the canonical materials to
warn us that in the mind of a medieval bishop the work of administering
his diocese in accordance with the canons is the heart of his pastoral work,
1 57
and ought to be carried out in a manner becoming a shepherd of souls.

151. Can. 18, London 1268, 23 MANSI 1233-4. For an example of a sequestration for
dilapidation, see REG. TRILLEIC supra note 127, at 109.
152. C. 4, X, III, 48 ("cogi debeant"). C. 1 of the same title calls for the assistance
of the beneficed clergy in the repair of their church, but sets up no sanction.
153. C. 10, C. X, q. 1; c. 3, D. 1, de cons.
154.

Sequestration, in RICHARD BURN, 2 ECCLESIASTICAL

LAW 329-30

(London,

1763).

For examples of the royal writ involved see REG. TRILLEX supra note 127, at 256-7. It
appears that the kings used this process to reach clerics for other purposes as well as the
collection of debts. Id. 326. A more general use of in rem sanctions by ecclesiastical authorities on their own is suggested by a letter in REG. T. CANTILUPE, supra note 106, at 149,
ordering his deans to warn the beneficed clergy not to store tithes elsewhere than on
glebe land - as some have done to avoid ecclesiastical distraint - on pain of immediate
sequestration. I can find no indication of the nature or use of the ecclesiastical distraint
to which Cantilupe refers. The English bishops developed in a few cases procedures
patterned after those of the royal administration; this may represent an abortive step in
the same direction.
155. The 1918 Code (Can. 1673) provides for a comparable process, but the compilers give no source for their enactment in the previous law.
156. ULLMAN, op. cit. supra note 10, at 74: "The pope's jurisdiction and law were
concerned with the conduct and actions of Christians, not with their (dead) possessions."
157. I am not so much taking issue with Thompson's description of the medieval conception of the episcopal office, THOMPSON 40-2, as stating the other side of the coin.
The confounding of pastoral and administrative functions is no better for the administration than it is for the pastorate.
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G. Suspension and Deprivation.-A number of punishments in the canonical system related to the cleric's tenure of his benefices and his clerical
status. They ranged from a short period of suspension from benefice or other
source of income to permanent reduction to the lay state. It appears that
these should not be regarded as another form of penance, but rather as a
distinct sanction. Unless the offender failed to appear when summoned,
neither excommunication nor absolution formed any part of the procedure
leading up to them: the moral rehabilitation of the offender punished in
this way was evidently left to the ordinary processes of private confession.
Except in the case of short suspensions inflicted on account of relatively
minor infractions, it was not customary to inflict punishments of this kind
until the offender had been given a monition and an opportunity to reform. 15 8 Even where the canons purported to inflict the punishment auto-

matically, as we have seen, the tendency was to give the offender a chance
to rehabilitate himself before exposing him to their full rigor. This leniency
seems to be another product of the moralizing tendency of the whole system. 1 9
The moralizing tendency evidently affected the severity of this class of
punishments as it did that of penances. Miss Hill tells us that the cleric who
procured ordination outside his diocese without the requisite letters dimissory was "usually punished by a short period of suspension from celebrating
mass or from holding a cure of souls.'

60

This punishment was probably

reasonably proportioned to the moral guilt involved in failing to abide by
a technical rule of this kind. From an administrative standpoint, however,
the rule was of considerable importance. Wholesale failure to abide by it
placed the efforts of a bishop to improve the quality of his ordinands at the
mercy of the least responsible of his colleagues. This was not the kind of
consideration likely to occur spontaneously to the mind of a young man
aspiring to ordination; thus, the moral guilt of the violator could scarcely
have been expected to correspond to the importance of the law. In this context, apportioning the punishment to moral guilt overlooked an important
educative function of the law: the severity of the punishment plays a significant part in teaching the importance of the law. Punishing one offender
158. Mollat, supra note 123. It appears that this principle was departed from in order
to reward the zeal of informers in search of papal provisions. See 5 CAL. PAPAL REG. 98,
173 (1398) for mandates ordering the trial of a beneficed cleric for an offense, the accused to be deprived if found guilty and the informer put into his benefice.
159. See in this connection C. 11, X, I, 2, an interpretation by Innocent III of a statute
of the University of Paris providing for the dismissal of a member who violates the
statutes after three monitions. Innocent says that unless the statute expressly provides
otherwise, the person so dismissed is to be reinstated upon his repentance and promise
to reform.
160. Hill, supra note 116, at 218. C. 1, C. XXI, q. 2 seems more severe.
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lightly because he did not think the violation very important might. well
lead the next man to think the violation was not very important because
it was punished so lightly.
Coordinate with the use of suspension and deprivation as a punishment
for the moral lapses of the clergy was the failure to use it as an administrative measure. It appears not to have been possible to remove a man from
his benefice on the mere ground that he was unable to do effectively the
job for which the benefice was provided. Such a one might be assigned a
coadjutor to do the work, and required to assign him a "congrua sustentatio"
out of the fruits of the benefice. This procedure is provided for in the Decretals in the case of a person suffering from some physical disability,' 6 '
and there is a record of its being done in the case of a person unable to
speak the language of his parishioners. 16 2 Under some circumstances, a beneficed cleric might be allowed to resign if he were willing to, although he might
instead be accused of proposing a cowardly desertion of his flock - Innocent
III dealt with this subject at a great length. 163 But in no case could he be
deprived of his benefice for mere incompetence or disability. As a canon,
taken from Gregory the Great, that heads up the title of the Decretals on sick
or debilitated clergy puts it:
Since, when one is stricken in body, we cannot know whether in the judgment of God it was for his punishment or for his purgation we ought not
164
to add to the affliction of those who have been thus scourged ...

When we speak of the sanctions in a legal system, we refer to the sum
total of the measures it takes for imposing upon society the standards it
envisages. These measures include motivating desirable behavior, deterring
undesirable behavior, and reshaping affairs when undesirable behavior has
taken place in order to mitigate its consequences as much as possible. The
161.

C. 3, 5, 6, X, III, 6. C. 4 of the same title seems at first blush to envisage his

removal on a pension, but in the light of the other canons, I would not so interpret it.

162.
v. 10,
163.
164.

ROTULM ROBERTi GROSSETESTE (1235-53) 499-500 (Canterbury and York Society,
F. N. Davis, ed., 1913).
C. 10, X, I, 9.
C. 1, X, III, 6. The provisions of can. 2147 of the 1918 Code, allowing the

ordinary to remove a man from his benefice in the interest of an effective ministry,
rather than by way of punishment, are modern in origin. Naz, Offices Ecclisiastiques, 6

DDC 1074, 1100. The circumstances authorizing such a procedure seem to be drawn
from the traditional grounds for appointing a coadjutor (which procedure is preserved
in can. 475, and is to be used instead of privation unless it appears that the good of
souls cannot be served in that way), and from the grounds listed by Innocent III, C. 10,
X, I, 9 as warranting the resignation of a benefice.
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canonical system sought to accomplish all these aims by a powerful and
subtle moral witness calculated to instill in the hearts and consciences of
men the vision of order on which the system was based. It is because of this
concentration on moral witness that the system seems hopelessly ineffective
from the standpoint of the determined and incorrigible bad man we have
been considering. The sanctions that were regularly imposed were not sufficiently burdensome to deter him, and the sanctions that were sufficiently
burdensome were used only as a last resort - deferred for long periods in
the hope that the culprit might yet reform. Nor was any effort made while
his reform was awaited to mitigate the harm he was doing to the fabric of
the Christian society or to the work and witness of the Church.
In short, pastoral solicitude was the keynote of the sanction structure
of the medieval canon law, as pastoral instruction and exhortation were the
keynote of its substantive content. A system of this kind showed a good deal
of capacity for governing the Christian community at a time when it was
a live option in the society whether to belong to that community or not. But
a system that is to order a whole society must check in some way the bad
man as well as the good, because a whole society will exhibit an important
number of such men.
V.

CONCLUSION

WHAT SEEMS to emerge from the foregoing analysis is that the highly developed juridical structure given the canon law by its early medieval theorists
did not turn the system from its basic orientation toward the support and
guidance of the personal pastorate by the corporate witness of the Church.
This orientation led the system to its characteristic stresses on formal articulation at the expense of functional application, on pastoral leadership at
the expense of legal obligation, and on moral correction at the expense of
physical coercion.
This close connection with the pastorate imposed on the canonical system an eschatological understanding of its goals: where secular systems aim
at the establishment and maintenance of a concrete and realizable external
social order, the canon law aimed at the ultimate establishment of the Kingdom of God over the hearts of men. By the same token, since the goal was
eschatological, there could be no question of marshalling available resources
for its foreseeable achievement: where secular systems work through the
available means of social control, the canon law worked through a personal
and corporate witness to the underlying eschatological vision.
The difference between the canon law as animated by these pastoral and
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eschatological commitments and a secular legal system was obscured by the
theoretical elegance and practical unreality of the late Roman secular law
all the more so as that system received renewed theoretical vigor from
the medieval legists after it had ceased to be living law in any existing society. But if we look for an example of a secular system not in the Roman
law, but in the early medieval secular systems as they painfully shaped their
scant resources of social control for the achievement of a rudimentary order
in society, the contrast is apparent enough. The churchmen were not unaware
of this contrast, but they tended to see it in eschatological rather than practical terms; they found their law superior to the world's law as the Kingdom
of God is superior to the kingdoms of the world. 16 5 This formulation of the
contrast between the two systems is, of course, very wide of the mark.
What I am suggesting here is not so much that the canon law was bad
as that it was not in the usual sense a legal system. The pastoral and eschatological orientation of the canon law as I have described it arises out of
the basic commitment of the Church as a religious institution, and is far
more important to the Church than a legal system is. But the fact remains
that if a legal system is -as
most modem jurists would conceive it to be
necessarily oriented toward the imposition and maintenance of a desirable
social order through the efficacious application of the available means of
social control, the medieval canon law was not essentially a legal system. Dum
colitur Maria, expellitur Martha. Given the responsibilities assumed by the
medieval church, together with its great resources in material and personnel,
the canon law had necessarily the work of a legal system to do. This work,
by and large, it did badly, precisely because its guiding vision was fixed on
higher and better things.

165.

This spirit is by no means dead among canonists. See the dedication to MATTHEW
A MANUAL OF CANON LAW (Hoboken, 1948): "Pagan Rome once said:
Salus REIPUBLICAE Suprema Lex but Christian Rome replied: Salus ANIMARUM
Suprema Lex and Christian Rome survived."
RAMSTEIN,

